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Front cover photo: Shelby Casey studied abroad in Sweden; seeing the Northern Lights had always been some-
where at the top of her list of things she needed to do. As soon as she got the chance— she was ready, fur hat, snow 
onesie, camera in freezing hand. When she saw nature’s ballet, she almost couldn’t take a picture. She was won-
derstruck and in awe, and needless to say, not disappointed.
Photo by Shelby Casey, Class of 2020, Biology and Neuroscience
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This is Munchie, an infamous mascot of the Carolina International Relations Association. She’s pictured on a 
dock on St. Maarten, the southern Dutch half of an island shared with the French in the Caribbean.
Photo by Logan Anderson, Class of 2022, Global Studies major
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FROM THE EDITOR
     Despite the many challenges of this remote semester, the Internationalist has maintained its strong 
commitment to showcasing stellar pieces of student research and writing. Even a global pandemic could 
not stop us from continuing to carve out space in academia for talented undergraduates to be recog-
nized. The accomplished authors whose articles you’re about to read – and surely enjoy – are incredibly 
worthy of that recognition. 
     Moreover, the enthusiastic effort, diligence, and perseverance of the entire Internationalist team this 
semester have catalyzed sweeping changes for the journal – we now have both a website and an inter-
national relations blog publishing student-written pieces weekly. This has enabled us to reach wider 
readership and start important conversations about issues that plague the modern day. 
     I’m incredibly excited to see where these new projects take us in the coming semesters. 
     Special thanks go out to Aida Al-Akhdar, my Executive Editor, whose honest leadership and untiring 
determination has been a great asset to this journal; our Head Design Editor Mariana Hererra, whose 
sheer talent and enthusiasm continues to blow me away; and our former Editor-in-Chief Patrick Clif-
ford, who has been a wonderful mentor to me and an even better friend. 
     I give my biggest thanks of all to our incredibly talented staff – the Fall 2020 edition truly wouldn’t 
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Justice as a Decolonial Process
By Phoebe Margaret Flaherty
Phoebe Flaherty is pursuing majors in public policy and colonial & decolonial studies within the 
interdisciplinary studies major. Phoebe is a member of the class of 2022, and spent the spring 
semester of 2020 studying post-genocide restoration and peacebuilding in Kigali, Rwanda pri-
or to the COVID-19 pandemic. Her interests in the development and deconstruction of colonial 
ideologies stem from her passions for Indigenous sovereignty in Canada, and the many ways in 
which colonial ideologies are developed and deconstructed. This piece is inspired by the dualism 
of courts in post-colonial states to both bolster colonial projects and contribute to decoloniza-
tion. 
ing legacies of European coloniza-
tion have worked to transform the 
geography and people of a region 
to the benefit of the colonial power. 
Colonization is a form of domina-
tion, and the social transformation 
it catalyzes is profound. Beyond be-
ing a mere economic exercise in raw 
resource acquisition, the impacts 
of colonization have far exceeded 
the industrial revolution-based or-
igin story of European colonialists 
in Africa and instead represents an 
exercise in international power dy-
namics. In many cases, colonizers 
intentionally manipulated the tradi-
tions, cultures, and social structures 
of a nation, transferring the people 
of the region to a colony-based way 
of life. Thus, the exploitation of one 
society for the benefit of another is 
intrinsically tied to human history, 
and has left a permanent stain on 
many post-colonial societies even 
after political independence from a 
colonizer is gained. One need only 
consider the African continent, and 
more specifically, the Rwandan state, 
to observe the capacity of coloniza-
tion to force social transformation, 
and how colonial legacies continue 
to reveal themselves long after the 
colonizer’s retreat.
     The structure of contemporary 
Rwandan society, like many other 
post-colonial states, remains heavi-
ly influenced by a long and painful 
history of Western exploitation and 
manipulation. Dominant religions, 
evolving national languages, and 
defined state borders in Rwanda 
serve as reminders of colonial rule, 
accompanied by a long history of 
colonial-derived legal practices on 
which the present-day legal system 
stands. Existing as a post-colonial 
state with political independence, 
Rwanda is faced with the challenge 
of building a secure state on a tu-
multuous past. Rising from the ash-
es of the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
against the Tutsi, conversations on 
Rwanda’s path forward are often 
prefaced by discussions of colonial 
legacies. In recognizing the struc-
ture of Rwandan society as an ex-
tension of the colonial histories 
that have influenced so much of the 
P ower struggles make up the fabric of human history, with conflict and the desired dom-
inance of one society over another 
staining much of the past. In many 
ways, the contemporary global set-
ting is representative of centuries 
of power struggles at the societal, 
international, and ideological level. 
Pursuits of power in the global com-
munity have long been accompa-
nied by the exploitation and manip-
ulation of societies for the benefit of 
an imperial power. Long before the 
categories of first, second, and third 
world countries were introduced to 
the international community as an 
organizational model for global or-
der, the West had been positioned at 
the apex of international power dy-
namics. Largely maintained by the 
legacies of European colonialism, 
the modern power dynamics of the 
international community remain 
rooted in modern conceptions of 
Western superiority. Colonization, 
therefore, is an exercise in these 
power dynamics. The ideological 
inception, execution, and remain-
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country’s past, colonially-minded 
conversations draw attention to the 
fact that the dominant modes of 
thinking and production of knowl-
edge across Africa are continually 
“defined and dominated by a West-
ern world view.”1 Consequently,  If 
decolonization is considered the 
final step of the colonial process – 
preceded by pre-colonial society, 
colonization, and post-colonial so-
ciety – how can a country be con-
sidered “decolonized” if the face of 
the colonizer is tied to the ideolog-
ical and infrastructural foundations 
of society? When is a country truly 
free from the shackles of coloniza-
tion?
    In the early 1960’s, the United Na-
tions (UN) established the Decla-
ration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and 
People. Within the decade, “three 
dozen new states  in Asia and Afri-
ca achieved autonomy or outright 
independence from their European 
colonial rulers.”2 The sub-Saharan 
African countries that became in-
dependent between the 1950s and 
1960s officially entered an age of 
post-colonialism upon gaining this 
independence, however it is import-
ant to differentiate post-colonial-
ism from decolonization. The term 
“post-colonial” has devolved from 
its original temporal meaning of 
colonies gaining independence, and 
is now commonly used to discuss 
the cultural, social, political, and 
economic effects of colonization 
on former colonies . Within Dun-
can Ivisan’s definition of the word, 
post-colonialism suggests that a 
country has the ability to overcome 
the wounds of colonization while 
being faced with the struggles of 
new forms of global empire build-
ing.3 In the interest of this paper, 
post-colonialism will refer to both 
the state of a colony gaining political 
independence from the colonizer, as 
well as to a former colony’s ability 
to grapple with colonial legacies. 
Recognizing that colonization itself 
may officially end with a nation’s 
independence, coloniality remains. 
Defined as “the long-standing pat-
terns of power that [have] emerged 
as a result of colonialism,”4 it is crit-
ical to consider colonization as an 
ongoing process within internation-
al power dynamics. Within the UN’s 
Declaration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries 
and People, previously colonized 
nations were welcomed “into free-
dom and independence…[under 
the belief that] all peoples have an 
inalienable right to complete free-
dom, the exercise of their sovereign-
ty and the integrity of their nation-
al territory.”5 The independence of 
colonial nations was integrated into 
the UN agenda as part of a grand 
gesture that vowed to “brin[g] to a 
speedy and unconditional end co-
lonialism in all its forms and man-
ifestations.”6 However, in equating 
decolonization to state political sov-
ereignty, the coloniality of African 
exploitation by European coloniz-
ers remains unchallenged.7 Striving 
for the large-scale independence of 
previously colonized nations, the 
UN’s declaration expressed notions 
of state-independence reminiscent 
of Westphalian sovereignty. While 
equating decolonization to the es-
tablishment of an independent state 
may be enticing in its simplicity, 
ending colonization in all its forms 
and manifestations is necessary for 
decolonization—anything else is 
considered an injustice.8
     Colonization annihilates a peo-
ple’s culture by imposing the colo-
nial power’s cultural system over 
existing epistems and traditional 
practices.9 In Rwanda, this includes 
the imposition of Christianity over 
traditional religious beliefs and a 
European-inspired justice system 
over community-led practices. In 
this context we continue to ques-
tion whether a post-colonial coun-
try can shed the coloniality that 
has manifested within government 
structures when the legacies of the 
colonizer are compatible with the 
norms of the international commu-
nity. Post-colonialism, in the eye of 
the colonizer, was never intended to 
remove the influence of the Euro-
pean nation over the post-colonial 
society. Instead, post-colonial eras 
have historically signified the efforts 
of colonialists to no longer keep col-
onies in the empire, but to keep the 
newly post-colonial states tied to a 
colonial way of life.10 There is a will-
ingness of the colonizer to relinquish 
control, but only if colonial meth-
ods of business and administration 
continue to permeate the territory.11 
With Western-inspired cultures of 
administration and justice enforced 
as international norms by the UN, 
how can a country pursue paths 
towards decolonization when colo-




Next, this paper will consider the 
debate between cultural relativism 
and universalism in the application 
of human rights, and whether or not 
departures from the international 
norms are acceptable in countries 
that have ratified the UN human 
rights convention. Lastly, this paper 
will consider the potential effective-
ness of gacaca as a valuable tool in 
the process of decolonization. 
Part I: A Brief History of 
Rwanda
     Prior to European contact, Rwan-
da existed as a kingdom much larger 
than the borders of the contempo-
rary Rwandan state. In its Pre-Co-
lonial history, the social hierarchy 
of the Rwandan kingdom consisted 
of the King, the royal court, and the 
subsidiary communities under the 
control of the monarchy. Subsidi-
ary communities were divided into 
three categories: Batutsi (Tutsi), re-
ferring to one’s role as a cattle and 
land owner; Bahutu (Hutu), refer-
ring to one’s role as an agricultural-
ist working leased land; and Batwa 
(Twa), referring to one’s role as a 
hunter-gatherer.12 The longstand-
ing divides between the Hutus and 
Tutsis that culminated with the 1994 
genocide do not, therefore, originate 
from pre-colonial society. The titles 
of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa indicated 
neither tribe nor ethnic group, and 
all groups were united by a common 
language, religion, and the occa-
sional marriage.13 Thus, theories of 
“ancient hatred” as the origin of ten-
sions between Hutu and Tutsi have 
no historical grounding.
     When the African continent was 
fractured and distributed to different 
European nations in the Berlin Con-
ference of 1884-85, the geography of 
the Rwandan kingdom was incor-
porated into what became known as 
German East Africa.14 Rwanda was 
dominated but not settled by Eu-
ropean colonizers – becoming part 
of the rush for raw resources that 
fueled European economic expan-
sion in the “scramble for Africa.”15 
The strategic use of missionaries 
and the movement of administra-
tive and legal institutions from the 
control of the monarchy to the co-
lonial power solidified Rwanda’s po-
sition as a German colony. In 1919, 
after a League of Nations mandate 
redistributed German owned terri-
tories to other colonial powers post-
World War II, Rwanda was put un-
der Belgian control. Controlling the 
territories of Ruanda-Urundi and 
what was then known as the Belgian 
Congo, Belgium became a fierce 
colonizer of eastern Africa, leading 
what has since been referenced to 
as “the vilest scramble for loot that 
ever disfigured the history of hu-
man conscience.”16 With African 
deaths under Belgian rule estimated 
to be between ten to fifteen million 
between the Belgian Congo and Ru-
anda-Urundi, physical violence was 
partnered with the manipulation 
of Rwanda’s existing socio-cultural 
categories of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.17 
Employing the Hamitic myth, 
tutions? Despite post-colonialism 
claiming to give nations the space 
to undergo decolonial processes of 
political, economic, and cultural 
reclamation, enforced internation-
al norms remain rooted in Western 
culture, and in many ways, reinforce 
the colonial systems imposed on 
countries like Rwanda. However, 
when fundamentally changing the 
justice system to address the com-
pounding issues of colonial legacies, 
it goes to question whether or not 
the universal enforcement of inter-
national legislation makes adequate 
space for countries to pursue cultur-
ally relevant solutions towards de-
colonization. 
     So what is Rwanda? Post-colonial? 
Decolonized? Both? Upon the con-
clusion of the 1994 Rwandan geno-
cide against the Tutsi, the Rwandan 
government was faced with a huge 
challenge in reconciling its popula-
tion not only from the wounds of 
genocide, but also from the long-
standing legacies of colonization. 
This paper will review the potential 
for justice systems to be a tool in 
decolonizing a post-colonial soci-
ety. Centred on the attempts to de-
colonize post-colonial Rwanda, this 
paper will begin with a brief history 
of the country before reviewing the 
colonial legacies impacting Rwan-
da’s society and civil justice system. 
Next, this paper will explore the ori-
gins of gacaca – a community based 
justice system – and will review 
the potential for gacaca to coun-
teract the colonial legacies of both 
German and Belgian colonial rule. 
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which “was brought to Rwanda by 
Belgian missionaries who described 
Tutsis as a foreign race [originating] 
beyond Rwanda,”18 the Belgians fab-
ricated ethnic divides to bolster the 
colonial power structure. Attribut-
ing Tutsis to the concept of “White-
ness,” colonialists asserted that the 
taller height and lighter colouring of 
Tutsis in comparison to Hutus made 
the Tutsis most similar to the colo-
nizer out of the social strata - em-
powering colonialists to promote 
Tutsis as “more intelligent and better 
equipped to govern.”19 Consequent-
ly, the Belgian colonial administra-
tion systematically imposed divides 
between Hutus and Tutsis (the Twa 
largely excluded from the process), 
oppressing Hutus and uplifting Tut-
sis through educational curriculum, 
socio-economic standings, and po-
litical power.20 The power imbalance 
between Tutsis and Hutus was fur-
ther solidified in the 1930s, when 
the Belgian colonial administration 
issued the infamous ethnic identifi-
cation cards that would be used later 
in the 1994 genocide to differentiate 
Hutus from Tutsis.21
     Later, in Belgian-controlled 
Rwanda, Hutus, as the largest eth-
nic group in Rwanda, appropriated 
the fabricated ethnic divides that 
were enforced by Belgian coloniz-
ers and “treated all Tutsi[s] as un-
trustworthy foreign invaders who 
had no rights and deserved no 
consideration.”22 Upon gaining in-
dependence from Belgium in 1962, 
first Rwandan President Grégoire 
Kayibanda asserted Hutu majori-
ty power through his party’s poli-
tics. Later overthrown in a coup by 
Rwandan president Juvenal Haby-
riamana in 1973, neither president 
effectively addressed the growing 
ethnic tensions in Rwanda, nor rec-
onciled the periodic mass-killings 
of Rwanda’s Tutsi population.23 The 
hostility against the Tutsi minority 
grew into a government-supported 
campaign of anti-Tutsi propaganda 
bolstered by government-sponsored 
hate radio station Radio Télévision 
Libre des Mille Collines.24 When 
President Habyarimana’s plane was 
shot down on April 6th 1994, the 
Rwandan genocide against the Tut-
si was triggered and one hundred 
days of calculated violence began.25 
The genocide came to a close on July 
15th, 1994 after over 800,000 Rwan-
dans had died and “over two million 
refugees [from Rwanda had been 
displaced to] neighbouring coun-
tries.”26 
Part II: Colonial Legacies in 
Rwanda’s Social Structure 
and Justice System
     The African continent and its con-
temporary socio-economic chal-
lenges are often referenced as prime 
examples of colonial legacies. Forced 
to succumb to the colonial ideals of 
European nations, “colonial hege-
mony and rationality is very much 
alive today in all parts of [Africa:] in 
the education sector, in the econo-
my, in the ways knowledge is pro-
duced and validated, and indeed in 
the dominant modes of thinking…
[such is the concept of] neo-colo-
nialism.” Since the fracturing of the 
continent in 1885, the governing 
ideology of the “White Man’s Bur-
den,” which was originally written 
in the context of American imperi-
alism in the Philippines,  has driven 
colonial projects in Africa – largely 
influenced by the need for raw ma-
terials and a strong belief in the duty 
of the Western world to “civilize” 
those born outside of Western soci-
ety.27 Providing an ideological foun-
dation to colonial practices, the im-
position of European administrative 
practices radically restricted society, 
as did the cultural influence of the 
colonial power. Overwhelmingly, 
Christianity “was one justification 
that European powers used to col-
onize and exploit Africa,” as it syn-
chronized the Rwandan people with 
the newly imposed cultural ideals of 
European colonialists.28 Having had 
a sustained influence over Rwanda 
since European contact, the power 
of European administrations and 
Christianity over Rwandan society 
are a testament to the colonial lega-
cies steeped into post-colonial soci-
eties globally.
     Colonial projects may vary in 
structure, but they are all bound by 
the manipulations of power dynam-
ics par consequence of the colonial 
power. While some countries are 
the products of settler colonialism 
(i.e. the British Empire in Canada, 
Australia, South Africa, etc.), others 
experience colonialism as a form of 
12
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by the colonial power’s “concern to 
not compromise the image of the 
White man”, and the use of force and 
structural change to reinforce white 
supremacy.32 Across the transfer of 
colonial power between Germany 
and Belgium, “Belgium imported 
the civil and criminal codes of the 
then Belgian Congo to Rwanda and 
Burundi,” imposing on them a new 
system of civil administration estab-
lished by the Germans.33 Continu-
ing the colonial project of imposing 
Western-based laws on East African 
populations, Belgium “ignor[ed] the 
unique characteristics of Rwandan 
and Burundian society,”34 and con-
tinued to develop Western-inspired 
institutions in the region. 
     Western conceptions of land own-
ership and private property have 
been repeatedly used to the advan-
tage of European colonizers. Land 
and resource acquisition is a driving 
force behind colonial projects, and 
the use of Christianity in achieving 
these feats persists as an intellectual 
tool to the colonizer.  Missionaries 
are responsible for much of the ear-
ly European contact with Rwanda, 
as “Christianity…[was used as] a 
guise [through] which Western gov-
ernments justified the exploitation 
and conquest of African nations…
to spread what they believed was a 
just and compassionate doctrine…
[and] degrade the culture and soci-
ety of the African people.”35 While 
the involvement of missionaries and 
Christian faith organizations persist 
in contemporary Rwanda, it is criti-
cal to analyze the use of Christianity 
as a key component of Belgian co-
lonial projects. When Catholicism 
was introduced by Europeans to 
Rwanda in 1900, colonizers found 
power in the capacity of Christi-
anity to alter the “belief, cults, be-
haviour and rites of many.”36 As the 
German presence in Rwanda grew, 
the influx of missionaries from Eu-
rope was put under the control of 
the German authorities along with 
the trade economy.37 Consequent-
ly, the involvement of Christianity 
in the growing Rwandan trade in-
dustry was streamlined to bolster 
the growth of Christian tradition in 
Rwanda and any negative act com-
mitted by a missionary, including 
“cattle raids by foreigners and the 
acts of violence they perpetrated,” 
were protected from prosecution.38 
The new religious culture in Rwanda 
opposed many traditional practices, 
a fact that the Republic of Rwanda39 
outlines as the beginning of a state 
sponsored religion in Rwanda, and 
the oppression of non-“Western” re-
ligions by colonizers. Thus, colonial 
support for Christian missionaries 
established the economic founda-
tions for colonial resource exploita-
tion, and a degree of religious ho-
mogeneity between the colonizer 
and the colonized – making it easier 
to advance colonial projects across 
common religious ground.
     When the Germans decentral-
ized the civil justice process from 
the Rwandan royal court, the estab-
lishment of Catholicism was used to 
economic exploitation under an im-
perial project (i.e. the United States 
in the Philippines and Puerto Rico). 
While the role of German imperial-
ism is often understated in favour of 
Belgium’s role in building a post-co-
lonial society capable of genocide, it 
is critical to consider the adminis-
trative processes established to gov-
ern Rwanda throughout its colonial 
era. 
     European involvement in “Ru-
anda-Urundi” shifted from the eco-
nomic explorations of the German 
East Africa Country, which operated 
through contracts with local kings, 
to the development of a German co-
lonial administration imposed upon 
a weakened Rwandan monarchy.29 
The incorporation of Germany into 
the power of the Rwandan monar-
chy drastically altered the Rwandan 
state, as “the King was [no longer] 
managing or travelling throughout 
Rwanda as he wanted…[and] had 
to have a known place in which he 
could meet with White People.”30 
Pressured to abide with the wants 
of Europeans, judicial power was 
disseminated from the core of the 
Monarchy and alternatives to the 
royal court were constructed as new 
civic gathering places – marking the 
official establishment of a German 
civil administration.31 The manip-
ulation of ethnic divides forged by 
European colonizers, the mainte-
nance of colonial infrastructure 
such as a Western imposed judicial 
system and the entrenched ideals 
of White superiority were bolstered 
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create a society that differed from 
traditional societal norms and was 
compatible with the culture of the 
colonial power. Catholicism and 
Christian values at large have been 
deeply entrenched into Western sys-
tems of justice – a “connection…
so intimate that it [is] usually taken 
for granted.”40 Despite religious plu-
ralism being protected in different 
Western societies, Western law is in-
herently Christian-centred, as many 
of the Western legal traditions were 
established nine centuries ago when 
the Roman Catholic Church first 
established its political and legal 
unity.41 The colonial foundations of 
Christianity in Rwanda are therefor, 
inextricable from the colonial pow-
er.  In regards to the legal founda-
tions of the colonizer, anti-discrim-
ination and equality are entrenched 
in Belgian law, yet the “principle of 
[State religious neutrality] is not laid 
down explicitly in the Belgian Con-
stitution.”42 Although anti-discrimi-
nation policies and the lack of a state 
sponsored church provide the legal 
foundations for religious plural-
ism, Foblets and Velaers refute the 
assumed secularism of the Belgian 
state by highlighting the unques-
tioned participation of state officials 
in Catholic ceremonies, the hanging 
of crucifixes in public buildings – 
which are often maintained under 
arguments of aesthetics and histo-
ricity – and the Belgian head of state 
kneeling to kiss the Pope’s ring in 
2009 to “honou[r] an outstanding 
compatriot.”43 The pervasiveness of 
the Catholic faith in Belgian soci-
ety showcases the inseparability of 
Christianity from the Belgian state 
– despite the constitutional support 
for diverse religious beliefs. The im-
position of Christianity initiated by 
German colonizers and furthered by 
the Belgians has since culminated 
within 56.5 percent of the popula-
tion being Roman Catholic and 93.6 
percent falling under the umbrella 
of Christianity as of 2013.44 Thus, 
in considering the colonial project 
of the Rwandan state, the Christian 
foundations of Belgian society must 
be linked both to the dominant cul-
ture of Christianity in Rwanda and 
to the existence of a Western-in-
spired justice system influenced 
by Christian ideals. It is therefore, 
apparent that non-traditional un-
derstandings of justice and religion 
have been entrenched in Rwandan 
society by colonial powers, as the 
structural injustices within Euro-
pean infrastructure “were carried 
forward by the [Rwandan] post-in-
dependence regime to perpetuate a 
similar system of domination, but 
now with Rwandans in power.”45
     As previously discussed, the laws, 
civil justice system, and dominant 
religious values of Rwanda have 
been heavily influenced by the role 
of European colonizers. Interest-
ingly, within the post-colonial and 
post-genocidal Rwandan context, 
the most discriminatory laws from 
the Colonial Era are said to have 
been abolished.46 However, some 
argue that colonial laws lie largely 
unaddressed until raised as a legal 
argument in a court of law.47 While 
Rwanda has the capacity to remedy 
colonial-era laws as well as the na-
tional legal structure, it has been ac-
knowledged that international insti-
tutions such as the UN continually 
favour Western countries and their 
respective legal practices— posing 
a barrier to Rwanda if the country 
ever sought to dispose of the West-
ern-rooted justice system.48 Consid-
ering the example of the sustained 
power of the United States within 
the UN, which Novosad and Werker 
account to institutional biases in the 
international system and a tenden-
cy for “political appointees [to be] 
frequently not loyal to the United 
Nations, but to their respective gov-
ernments,” the term “international 
community” is often synonymous 
with “the West.”49 The normativity 
of Western culture within the “in-
ternational community” is bolstered 
by both the continued dominance 
of the West in international institu-
tions and the colonial legacies that 
bind countries to Western social 
structures. Therefore, in an attempt 
to heal post-colonial societies of de-
structive colonial legacies and re-
vive the traditional social structures 
that were superimposed by Western 
systems, the revival of traditional 
systems such as gacaca are designed 
not only to “deal with trials, [but to 




56Forced to recover from mass-social 
trauma, Rwanda opted for a “home-
grown” system of justice to address 
the unprecedented judicial gridlock 
and necessary communal healing 
present in the wake of the genocide. 
Taking inspiration from traditional 
gacaca courts, “the ‘…new’ gacaca 
courts are in the truest sense an…
invented tradition.”57 It is critical 
to acknowledge that the new gaca-
ca did not mirror the pre-colonial 
structure exactly, but instead used 
the ideals of gacaca to create a legal 
system capable of promoting truth 
and reconciliation and addressing 
judicial gridlock. Under the amend-
ed Rwandan constitution of 2003, 
Article 152, Sub-section 2 states that 
the established gacaca courts are re-
sponsible for prosecuting and try-
ing persons accused of the crime of 
genocide perpetrated against Tutsi 
and other crimes against humanity 
committed between October 1st, 
1990 and December 31st, 1994. Ga-
caca’s imposition was also motivat-
ed in part by the Rwandan govern-
ment’s refusal to have foreign jurists 
working within its judicial system, 
and the history of limitations faced 
by international tribunals. Through 
constitutional reforms implement-
ed in 2003, gacaca was established 
to try thousands of cases under a 
decentralized justice system that at-
tempted to heal society with a new 
Rwandan approach. 
     The cultural roots of gacaca are 
important, but so are the contem-
porary motivations for the court’s 
formation. While the gacaca courts 
were able to address a greater num-
ber of cases at a significantly lower 
cost than both the Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da (ICTR) and the Rwandan Civil 
courts,58 gacaca remains to be heav-
ily criticized and praised by both 
African and Western academics. 
In an article by Alphonse Muleefu, 
Director of the University of Rwan-
da’s School of Law, and Dr. Felix 
Ndahinda, Director of Aegis Trust’s 
Research, Policy and Higher Edu-
cation, the debate of reconciliation 
versus retributive justice considers 
gacaca optimistically simply off of 
“what the gacaca process alone may 
be able to achieve in reconciling the 
Rwandan society or eradicating the 
culture of impunity.”59 Gacaca did 
have a retributive component to its 
proceedings; however, the pre-co-
lonial origins of gacaca tend to de-
tract from Western judicial norms.60 
Sentencing varied depending on the 
nature and relative severity of the 
crime,  placing convicted individu-
als into four different categories: 
The categories indicate the de-
gree of individual responsibility 
and the respective penalties [for 
the crime]. The first category 
includes leaders and organizers 
of the genocide, persons who 
abused positions of authority, 
notorious killers who distin-
guished themselves by their fe-
rocity or excessive cruelty and 
perpetrators of sexual torture. 
Category two includes the per-
Part III: Gacaca
     Inspired by traditional Rwandan 
community practices, gacaca was a 
gathering of respected communi-
ty elders in pre-colonial Rwandan 
society who were responsible for 
“preserving peace and harmony in 
the community.”51 Subscribing to 
the belief that “any offense tarnishes 
the image not only of the individual 
who committed it, but also the fami-
ly to which he/she belongs,” an indi-
vidual’s offences were considered to 
be a part of a community’s makeup, 
and were thus up to the communi-
ty to solve.52 In framing individual 
offences within the context of the 
community and under clan and fam-
ily solidarity, the community-based 
style of “this traditional system of 
conflict resolution ensured cohesion 
of a pluralistic society.”53 The role of 
gacaca in maintaining the harmony 
of pre-colonial Rwandan society is 
profound, and reflects many Rwan-
dan cultural ideals that have since 
been oppressed by colonialism. 
Thus, in the post-genocide context, 
returning to a pre-colonial inspired 
system of justice “constitute[d] a 
bridge between the ancient and the 
new Rwanda.”54 Intent on reviving 
the culture of a time when Rwanda 
was not necessarily more equal, but 
less divided, the imposition of the 
new gacaca attempted to transcend 
ethnicity and foster reconciliation 
after the genocide.55
     When one hundred days of geno-
cide in Rwanda came to a close, 
over 800,000 Rwandans had died.
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petrators of or accomplices to 
intentional homicides or serious 
assaults against individuals that 
led to their death. Category three 
contains persons guilty of other 
serious assaults against individ-
uals while category four covers 
persons who committed proper-
ty crimes.61
     The retributive punishments for 
each of these categories varied, but 
conventional prison sentences were 
included. The nature of the crime 
was considered along with how the 
indicted individual came to face 
the court. Whether an individual 
turned themselves in to court au-
thorities, withheld information, or 
failed to present themselves to the 
courts were all considered when de-
termining the level of punishment 
individuals would be awarded.62 The 
subsequent maintenance of gaca-
ca as a retributive justice technique 
is countered by the involvement of 
the community in the rendering of 
a truthful narrative and the com-
munity’s involvement in commu-
nal healing. Although there was 
pushback from the international 
community in developing commu-
nity-led justice practices in Rwanda, 
“the determination to move forward 
with the gacaca process in spite of 
dominant international objections 
was informed by the [country’s 
knowledge] of the Rwandan conflict 
[and] the perceived need to reinvent 
Rwandan society as a whole.”63 Af-
ter persisting as a cultural fixture 
throughout the colonial era, gacaca 
was reimplemented in 2003, and 
allowed for many post-genocide le-
gal issues to be addressed – but not 
without drawing criticism.
     With the desire for Western cul-
tural homogeneity at the forefront 
of many international institutions 
backed by the Western world, it is 
understandable to see why criticisms 
of gacaca courts are often labelled as 
Western regardless of whether an 
individual is “from the global West 
or from other continents includ-
ing Africa.”64 The “Western” label 
attributed to criticism refers less 
to its geographic origin, and more 
to how the criticism references the 
“norms, institutions or ideals root-
ed or embedded in Western legal 
and socio-political thought, even 
where some of them might have ac-
quired a universal (human rights) 
stamp.”65 An inability to escape 
Western ideologies in criticizing 
gacaca can inhibit the formation of 
a legitimate review of the courts – 
especially as gacaca is perceived as 
being contrary “to the established 
foundations of the globalised crim-
inal justice mechanisms of Western 
inception.”66 However, it is still crit-
ical to acknowledge the document-
ed human rights violations within 
gacaca, while still contextualizing 
them within a universalist school of 
thought. Gacaca has been criticized 
for failing to bring members of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to 
justice for genocide crimes – a par-
ticularly fraught problem as current 
President of Rwanda Paul Kagame 
is an RPF affiliate, and “the govern-
ment let it be known publicly and 
unambiguously that gacaca would 
not cover RPF crimes.”67 The “new” 
gacaca ran from 2003-2012, and re-
lied on local governments to collect 
information and run trials. Gacaca 
court judges were nominated by the 
community, and did not necessarily 
hold law degrees. Additionally the 
reported corruption of gacaca court 
judges and the coerced participa-
tion of some individuals in the trials 
have increased negative criticism, 
particularly as many gacaca partic-
ipants lied or remained silent due to 
intimidation, corruption, personal 
ties, or fear of repercussions.68 In 
failing to exercise the minimum in-
ternational standards of a fair trial, 
gacaca became the target of intense 
international scrutiny. However, the 
shortcomings of the gacaca judicia-
ry can be partially attributed to how 
the genocide destroyed much of the 
existing judicial infrastructure – 
particularly through the killing of 
many judges and other judicial staff.
     Although international stan-
dards were not universally upheld in 
post-genocide Rwanda, gacaca has 
combined a variety of justice theo-
ries within its structure. Stemming 
from Rwandan tradition, gacaca 
“combines different theories of jus-
tice: restorative or community jus-
tice,  punitive or retributive justice, 
and rehabilitation or reintegration 
of the offender.”69 Despite the inten-
tion of gacaca to unite Rwandans 
under a common cultural identity, 
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lating fundamental rights instilled 
in the constitution. The stipulations 
of the UN’s UDHR and the Geno-
cide Convention combined created 
a negetively-charged atmosphere for 
the post genocidal country, as the 
systems that were being perscribed 
to Rwanda were ineffective at allevi-
ating pressure from the justice sys-
tem, and came with high financial 
cost to the country. Therefore, the 
debate on the universality of justice 
processes comes into play within 
the Rwandan context. Do coun-
tries reserve the right to produce 
and practice justice processes that 
are relative to the culture? Or must 
countries abide by the standards set 
by international governing bodies? 
     Universalism is embodied by in-
ternational institutions that strive 
to promote diplomacy and peaceful 
relations between the world’s na-
tions. In its most radical form, uni-
versalism gives “absolute priority to 
the demands of the cosmopolitan 
moral community over all other 
(“lower”) moral communities [...in 
a] complete denial of national and 
subnational ethical autonomy and 
self-determination.” In the context 
of universalism, every country that 
is a member of the UN has signed 
the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) – symboliz-
ing a shared understanding of the 
human condition across different 
cultural contexts. As if to supersede 
the different traditions, values, and 
practices of different cultural con-
texts, universalism seeks to establish 
international norms that function 
above variances in global cultures.72 
Universalism exists largely in the 
structure of the world today, and 
can be seen within any large process 
that binds the global community to 
a common medium. An inherent 
trait within international legislation, 
processes of homogenizing interna-
tional communities are also visible 
within the growing global market-
place, expedited by the rise of inter-
national corporations. Consequent-
ly, radical universalism has been 
referred to as moral imperialism, as 
the inflexible nature of radical uni-
versalism ignores cultural context 
and prescribes strict notions of right 
and wrong to the global communi-
ty.73 It is critical to acknowledge that 
many of the points of the UDHR 
were held as universal values in 
most societies before being enforced 
by international legislation. Notably, 
“protection from arbitrary rule, pro-
tection of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, the guarantee of a place in 
the life of the community and access 
to an equitable share of the means 
of subsistence are central moral as-
pirations in nearly all cultures.”74 Of 
course, the assumed universalism of 
these values without international 
enforcement has not been absolute, 
and one only need look at the course 
of human history to see how human 
suffering has gone unfettered by the 
international community. After the 
creation of the UDHR, communally 
understood notions of human rights 
were set into international law, as 
the cultural familiarity of the pro-
cess did little to hide the revolution-
ary creation that was gacaca – pro-
viding solutions to a post-colonial 
and post-genocidal society that was 
far from the methods universally 
accepted by the international com-
munity. 
Part IV: Cultural Relativism 
vs Universalism
     The aftermath of the 1994 Rwan-
dan genocide against the Tutsi 
continued to challenge the already 
fragile Rwandan state. With over 
120,000 people detained in the wake 
of the genocide, the pace of pro-
ceedings inspired estimates that it 
would take “anywhere between two 
and four centuries to try all those 
in detention.”70 As a country that 
had signed the UN Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, the Rwan-
dan government was faced with the 
administrative nightmare of being 
caught amidst the international 
regulations surrounding large-scale 
human atrocity, and the responsi-
bility of the government to heal a 
severely fractured society. Article 
11.1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights instills in people the 
right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law in a 
public trial at which they have had 
all the guarantees necessary for their 
defence.71 Further, Article 8 pro-
claims that everyone has the right to 
an effective remedy by the compe-
tent national tribunals for acts vio-
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were others rooted exclusively in 
the West. When enforcing human 
rights rooted in Western tradition 
(i.e. judicial proceedings), a uni-
versalist approach to human rights 
legislation runs the risk of being cul-
turally imperialistic – perpetually 
favouring Western cultural norms.
     Gacaca, however, is an exercise 
in cultural relativism, as notions of 
communal autonomy and self-de-
termination are inherent in the 
process of justice. Cultural relativ-
ism can be demonstrated at differ-
ent capacities – having a different 
level of influence depending on its 
severity. While radical cultural rel-
ativists hold that the “culture is the 
sole source of the validity of a moral 
right or rule,”75 cultural relativism 
at a weaker capacity “would recog-
nize a comprehensive set of prima 
facie universal human rights and al-
low only relatively rare and strictly 
limited local variations and excep-
tions.”76 Cultural relativism con-
textualizes situations within their 
cultural context, and is critical of 
international norms and how they 
impact the affected society. Howev-
er, extreme cultural relativism can 
be in direct opposition to univer-
salism – asserting the dominance of 
culturally informed practices rooted 
in tradition over universally recog-
nized systems. Within the African 
context, the argument of cultural 
relativism has been incited to apply 
modes of justice different from the 
ones prescribed by the international 
community. Examples on the Afri-
can continent outside of the Rwan-
dan context include:
Uganda; In an attempt to recon-
cile society from the conflicts in 
Northern Uganda’s Acholiland, 
an amnesty agreement was incit-
ed, where people were reintro-
duced to society with traditional 
ceremony and were not legally 
prosecuted.77
Malawi; President Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda used “tradition-
al courts” to face political oppo-
nents outside of the regular legal 
system, with judges and chiefs 
appointed by Banda, no defense 
attorneys present, and all appeals 
being made to Banda personally. 
These courts did “not have the 
slightest connection with au-
thentic traditional practices” but 
were marketed as such.78
     Considering the Malawian case, 
justice methods exercised under the 
air of “traditional society” provide 
a culturally relative argument for 
employing justice methods outside 
of universally upheld standards. In 
doing so, the Malawian “traditional 
courts” blatantly violated Article 11 
of the UDHR. In the Ugandan case, 
amnesty agreements were leveraged 
to stop the cycle of people joining 
northern Ugandan rebel groups, 
and to encourage people to reinte-
grate into society without the fear of 
facing criminal charges.79 However, 
it should be acknowledged that the 
highest-profile human rights viola-
tions within the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in Uganda were still held to 
the universalist standards of an in-
ternational trial.
     The debate surrounding human 
rights in the international commu-
nity risks painting universalism and 
cultural relativism as mutually ex-
clusive. Gacaca courts in Rwanda 
were founded both on a strong base 
of international criticism for cultur-
ally relative judicial practices and a 
lack of international attention to the 
country’s post-genocidal judicial 
issues. While gacaca did not guar-
antee the international standards 
of a fair trial, it offered a solution 
to judicial gridlock and communal 
healing. In lieu of gacaca’s benefits, 
a lack of political will from the in-
ternational community to stop the 
1994 genocide combined with inter-
national criticism against Rwanda’s 
“homegrown solution” speaks to 
the aforementioned “moral imperi-
alism” of universalism. The interna-
tional community did not seek-out 
any solutions to the judicial gridlock 
within Rwanda’s civil justice system 
nor the slow pace and high cost of the 
ICTR.80 Even within the ICTR, the 
court’s “prime function [was] widely 
perceived to be the reaffirmation of 
the international community’s own 
morality...it is about symbol politics 
[...which were] necessary in light of 
the total inaction of that same com-
munity during the genocide.”81 Still, 
upon the creation of legislation for 
gacaca, the international resistance 
to the communal justice system was 
widespread. Justifying the applica-
tion of justice methods outside of 
18
THE INTERNATIONALIST
trial aim to protect people involved 
in the justice process. Furthermore, 
this is not a question of “either or” 
when discussing cultural relativ-
ism and universalism, but more 
so about how much each school of 
thought will dictate the practices in 
that country. In the words of Audre 
Lorde, “the master’s tools will nev-
er dismantle the master’s house,” 
but perhaps they can be used to in-
spire a sustainable solution to a long 
standing problem.83
Conclusion: Freedom from 
the Past, Moving Forward 
Through Gacaca and Indig-
enization 
     In what is definitively a Post-Co-
lonial Era in Rwanda, gacaca has set 
a precedent in the international ap-
proach to justice, and the ability for 
individual countries to take care of 
their own affairs. As reviewed in the 
beginnings of this paper, post-colo-
nialism does not necessarily guaran-
tee decolonization, but rather makes 
the space for new epistemes to be 
challenged and naturalized. Finding 
the balance between 
 hegemony and Indigenous knowl-
edge systems, indigenization “does 
not mean changing something 
Western into something Indige-
nous…Rather, indigenization can 
be understood as the weaving or 
braiding together [of] two distinct 
knowledge systems so that [both can 
be] appreciated.”84 As a post-geno-
cidal method of justice, gacaca 
formed a bridge between pre-colo-
nial and post-colonial society while 
still adhering to the Western judicial 
tradition of retribution. In its exe-
cution, gacaca does not represent 
an outright rejection of universal 
practices, as it also does not repre-
sent a full revival of the pre-colonial 
system that was smothered by col-
onization. Rather, gacaca is a blend 
of two ways of being – balancing 
somewhere between a reclaimed 
pre-colonial Rwandan culture and 
the Western-inspired international 
systems of justice that are typically 
installed after mass human suffer-
ing. In approaching the question of 
decolonization, the revival of gacaca 
represents a multifaceted process of 
decolonization for Rwanda. While 
criticized for having flaws and vio-
lating the very international human 
rights that Rwanda had ratified, the 
readoption of gacaca worked to de-
construct colonial ideologies that 
champion the assumed superiority 
and privilege of Western culture, 
and reinstate a “homegrown solu-
tion” that departs from the West-
ern-influenced international norms. 
     The age of imperialism has de-
fined the power dynamics that are 
continually visible in the contempo-
rary global community. Interactions 
and violence between states in the 
pursuit for raw resources and great-
er international power are fixtures 
of society; particularly as the colo-
nization of Rwanda aimed not only 
to exploit the land for raw resourc-
es, but to also exploit the people of 
the region to make the reaping of 
universally upheld norms, the use of 
tradition as rhetoric for implement-
ing justice systems alternative to the 
international standards demands an 
alertness to “manipulations of a dy-
ing, lost, or even mythical cultural 
past…[only] tenous[ly] connect[ed] 
to the Indigenous culture.”82 Such 
rhetoric, including the proclama-
tions of corrupt regimes arguing 
that universally applied human 
rights laws are inappropriate, allows 
for the imposition of a less-regulat-
ed justice system that can act in fa-
vour of the political party in power. 
Despite the flaws in some cultural-
ly relative justice systems, gacaca 
played a huge role in reconciling 
Rwandan society – allowing for 
community-led truth and reconcil-
iation through testimony. The suc-
cess of gacaca can be attributed to 
its position within Rwandan society 
as a long-standing tradition. The in-
ability for universally enforced stan-
dards of a “fair trial,” largely rooted 
in Western culture, to be met with-
in Rwanda due to structural and 
fiscal restraints raises the question: 
does the moral imperialism of rad-
ical universalism exist as a form of 
neo-colonialism? Escaping the grips 
of the international community, the 
success of Rwanda’s gacaca courts 
suggest that culturally relative jus-
tice techniques have the potential 
to aid in a country’s decolonization. 
This is not to say that any rejection of 
universally upheld standards of jus-
tice helps aid a country, particularly 
as the UDHR’s standards of a fair 
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raw resources easier for the colonial 
power. While colonial processes are 
still ongoing, the historical legacies 
of colonization are often referenced 
as social fixtures needing to be rec-
tified and challenged once a country 
gains its independence. In escaping 
these legacies, countries are able to 
achieve a degree of self-determi-
nation in which colonial superi-
ority complexes no longer govern 
the country’s activities. Freedom 
from economic exploitation, free-
dom from colonial violence, and 
increased autonomy through state 
sovereignty grants countries a type 
of “decolonial” reality. The social in-
frastructure of pre-colonial Rwanda 
was re-evaluated and re-established 
by German and Belgian colonizers, 
leaving behind Christianity, West-
ern-European national languages, 
and a high level of paternalism from 
European nations. Having over-
whelmed the social infrastructure, 
religious practices, and cultural be-
liefs of pre-colonial Rwanda, gacaca 
demonstrated a revival of Rwandan 
culture that rejected many colo-
nial era cultural fixtures. Departing 
from the Western inspired court 
systems left over from the German 
and Belgian presence in Rwanda, 
gacaca legitimized pre-colonial so-
cial systems within the post-colo-
nial era. Therefore, the ability of 
gacaca to “decolonize” post-colonial 
Rwanda lies in its ability to “indig-
enize” Rwandan society – blending 
pre-colonial systems into the con-
temporary approach to justice and 
reconciliation after the genocide.
     Western colonialism is rooted 
in conceptions of European supe-
riority that have persisted into the 
modern day. As reviewed in Part II 
of this paper, international institu-
tions have been criticized for failing 
to equally represent the interests of 
all countries involved. The push for 
international homogeneity is root-
ed in Western cultural superiority 
– a shared characteristic between 
the Western power dynamics and 
Western-based understandings of 
human rights are at the forefront of 
the “international community” – as-
serted regardless of cultural context. 
Contrasting universalism to cultur-
al relativism, gacaca considers both 
schools of thought while favour-
ing the culturally relative ability of 
Rwanda to determine itself. To es-
cape the moral imperialism of a uni-
versalist mentality, gacaca was used 
as a decolonial tool to move beyond 
the established international norms 
bolstered by the Western commu-
nity. Universalists would condemn 
gacaca for its human rights viola-
tion and inability to adhere to the 
international standards of fair trails, 
rather the rejection of Western pa-
ternalism and Western-backed ho-
mogeneity, contributing to the de-
colonial process of post-colonial 
Rwanda. While contemporary inter-
national power dynamics no longer 
look like the brutal colonial histo-
ries of the past, the consistent supe-
riority of the West that is bolstered 
by international organizations and 
the remnants of colonial projects is 
directly challenged through gacaca. 
     Rectifying the power imbalanc-
es caused by Western superiority, 
gacaca demonstrates a way forward 
for many post-colonial societies. In 
achieving decolonization, countries 
can find a new way forward from 
the trauma of the past, in a way that 
meets the culturally relevant needs 
of the society. Does decolonization 
mean rejecting all social fixtures 
rooted in colonization? No. But it 
does represent a reclamation of the 
past in a way that benefits contem-
porary society, and can be braided 
together with the practices of the 
international community. Gacaca, 
while both heavily criticized and, 
in many ways, highly effective, rep-
resents a duality in what can be 
achieved in the international com-
munity. There are therefore, ways 
to find a meeting point between 
opposing facets of the international 
community: cultural relativism and 
universalism, history and future, 
and Western and non-Western cul-
ture. Gacaca toes the line between 
concepts that at first seem mutual-
ly exclusive, but can be brought to-
gether as a representation of what 
post-colonial societies can achieve 
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The traffic was unusually light on this Thursday afternoon in downtown Yangon. Built sometime in the 1920s, the 
building shown here is a vestige of Burma’s colonial past and remnant of British 20th-century imperialism. Star-
ing at this structure made me realize how much the world has changed in only one lifetime, for it was only seven 
decades ago that the Republic of the Union of Myanmar became an independent nation.  
Photo by Patrick Clifford, Class of 2020, Public Policy and Political Science
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contention. 
     This friction is particularly rele-
vant in respect to the Arab Spring 
uprisings, which can be linked to a 
broader public rejection of neolib-
eral economics.2 My interest in this 
issue led me to study the Tunisian 
national trade union, the Union 
Générale Tunisienne du Travail 
(UGTT). As evidenced by the wide-
spread protests leading to the Tuni-
sian revolution in 2011, the Tunisian 
worker was not sufficiently aided by 
the efforts of the UGTT. However, 
the union (along with three other 
major civil society organizations) 
was entrusted with the task of es-
tablishing order in 2014 during a 
political crisis which threatened 
the democracy won by the Tuni-
sian revolution.3 In the context of 
Tunisian labor relations and gov-
ernment power,4 I chose to exam-
ine the UGTT as both a wielder of 
citizens’ and the state’s faith: two 
forces which are often diametrically 
opposed yet find an ostensible con-
fluence via the union. 
Background
     Tunisia’s history with trade 
unionism can be traced back to 
the origins of the decades-long in-
dependence movement against 
French occupation5—an important 
relationship between the social and 
the political sphere that the trade 
union presently works to maintain. 
Before the creation of the UGTT, 
there existed first the Confédération 
Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens 
(CGTT), a trade union founded in 
1924 by Mohammad Ali al Hammi 
which aligned itself with the Tuni-
sian nationalist and anti-colonial 
Destour party. This was the first 
What does the existence of a national trade union mean? As a 
form, the institution rose in popu-
larity and necessity after the Indus-
trial Revolution, and its multina-
tional presence has also depended 
on the simultaneous proliferation of 
the industrial sector in each coun-
try. As labor was forced into moder-
nity via the leveraging of wages, so 
too was the work force galvanized 
to stave off the most glaring parts 
of industrial working conditions by 
means of the formation of trade and 
labor unions. The existence of a na-
tional trade/labor union in a mod-
ern state is no new concept; many 
developed countries have significant 
proportions of their working popu-
lations involved in a trade union.1 
However, the efficacy and impact 
of these unions remains a point of 
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break from the French trade union, 
the Confédération Générale du Tra-
vail (CGT), to gain real autonomy 
on behalf of the Tunisian worker. 
The CGTT was quelled by the colo-
nial authorities. Years later in 1946, 
Farhat Hached formally established 
the UGTT.6 From the start, the 
union’s goal was to advocate for 
both workers’ rights and Tunisia’s 
independence from France. This 
duality is important to note here as I 
aim to trace the organization to the 
post-modern age in which there is 
no longer a direct colonial influence 
to point to, rather multiple forms of 
control (governmental, internation-
al, etc.) which the union ostensibly 
aims to subvert. 
     As was the case for other coun-
tries in the Maghreb with a histo-
ry of colonialism, the end of the 
colonial power did not lead to an 
increase in citizens’ power in the 
post-colonial state.7 In the absence 
of the French authority’s disci-
plinary control, power was simply 
transferred to new authoritarian 
(yet now described as “nationalist”) 
actors. The Neo-Destour party8 led 
the anti-colonial and nationalist ef-
fort to remove the French authority 
from Tunisia. After independence, 
this party assumed power. Howev-
er, there was a large conflict within 
Neo-Destour, primarily between its 
top leaders: Habib Bourguiba and 
Salah Ben Youssef.9 Due to his will-
ingness to accept the softer “auton-
omy” over independence, Bourgui-
ba chose to work with the leading 
French authorities in the process of 
independence, while Youssef took 
a more radical approach. Eventual-
ly, Bourguiba’s influence won over 
Youssef ’s and the former went on to 
become the first and longest Presi-
dent of Tunisia.10 Bourguiba also 
played a strong role in setting the 
tone of UGTT operations post-inde-
pendence.
     In order to understand the shifts 
that occurred in the UGTT post-rev-
olution in 2011, it is helpful to un-
derstand how the union changed 
after independence and how it op-
erated in the authoritarian regimes 
of both Habib Borguiba and Zine el 
Abidine Ben Ali. Much of the exist-
ing literature on the UGTT—partic-
ularly works written in or translated 
into English—focuses on its role in 
Tunisia’s revolution and the broader 
context of Arab Spring uprisings.11, 
12,13 For the scope of this study, how-
ever, it has been helpful to outline 
the nature of the UGTT pre-revo-
lution and the ways in which its in-
fluence was both strengthened and 
limited by the authoritarian regimes 
under which it operated. This is a 
theme that was also echoed in each 
interview I conducted. 
     Issue 56 of the Anarcho-Syndi-
calist Review discusses the ways in 
which the UGTT was suppressed by 
both Bourguiba and Ben Ali in the 
article: “Tunisia’s UGTT: Caught 
between struggle & betrayal.” The 
Bourguiba years held their fair 
share of conflict between the UGTT 
and the state, but in the ‘60s and ‘70s 
the former was allowed a relatively 
large level of autonomy. This auton-
omy subsequently led to planned 
retaliations by the state against the 
workers.14 One essential source to 
this discussion can be found in Is-
sue 67 of the Middle East Research 
and Information Project (MERIP) 
Journal, which included a report 
on a UGTT strike in late January 
of 1978: “A general strike called by 
the half-strong Union générale des 
travailleurs tunisiens (UGTT) was 
met with violence by the regime. 
Army, police and paramilitary units 
joined in a general offensive against 
the workers, leaving more than two 
hundred dead and hundreds more 
injured and arrested.”15 While this 
report contextualizes the impor-
tance and danger of protesting with 
the UGTT, it also reveals looming 
disparities between the former and 
current images of the institution. 
Where a general strike would gar-
ner the response of state violence in 
1978, today the same action is part 
of the sanctioned list of responses 
allowed by the government appara-
tus in response to economic discon-
tent. This sort of clashing was not 
allowed to continue, however, in the 
Ben Ali era:      
In 1989, Ben Ali’s regime im-
posed direct submission on the 
UGTT leadership, headed by Is-
mail Sahbani, who collaborated 
in the implementation of neo-
liberal economic policies and 
fiercely fought the union left...
The history of the leadership of 
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who was enrolled in his graduate 
seminar.  The questioning for the in-
terviews done with members of the 
UGTT differed from the questions 
asked of non-members. The pur-
pose of interviewing non-members 
was largely to determine a sense of 
public perception rather than insti-
tutional or official knowledge about 
the inner structure/working of the 
organization. 
     Further, I was able to contextu-
alize my findings based on a series 
of lectures attended in September 
and October 2019 via SIT’s academ-
ic program and the course “Poli-
tics, Civil Society, and Migration 
in Tunisia.” This course provided 
me with a broad historical back-
ground regarding the politics of Tu-
nisia, especially regarding the forces 
that both pushed the revolution in 
2011 and facilitated the formation 
of government and order following 
the revolution. A program visit to 
the Forum Tunisien pour les Droits 
Économique et Sociaux (FTDES), a 
Tunisian NGO formed after the rev-
olution to organize social and po-
litical movements, also aided me in 
understanding how the civil society 
sector is related to the UGTT as well 
as the government. I utilized this 
visit in particular to inquire about 
the manner in which jobs are cre-
ated and provided in Tunisia by the 
government and the role of UGTT 
influence. The representative of the 
FTDES whom we met with was ex-
tremely helpful in providing this 
information. From this conversa-
party à la the 1979 Iranian revolu-
tion. In this way, it is viewed as a 
worthy representative of the Tuni-
sian people based on its ability to 
uphold and protect the democra-
cy that they were protesting for in 
2011. However, the same economic 
symptoms which persisted before 
the 2011 revolution continue to ex-
ist today, so it remains to be seen 
whether authoritarianism is truly 
what was holding the UGTT back 
from affecting a stronger position 
for labor in Tunisia. 
Methodology
Overview
     This research is based primari-
ly on interviews as well as scholar-
ly sources, some of which outline 
the history of Tunisia and the trade 
union movement, and others which 
discuss the politics in post-revolu-
tion Tunisia. I conducted a series of 
four interviews with Tunisians liv-
ing in Northern Tunisia during the 
fall of 2019. These interviews were 
conducted with two members of the 
UGTT as well as two non-members. 
Interviews conducted with members 
were completed in French/Arabic 
with the aid of a translator, while the 
interviews with non-members of the 
union were conducted in English. I 
was able to interview the members 
of the UGTT thanks to the connec-
tions of my professor, Mounir Khe-
lifa, and my advisor, Rached Khal-
ifa. My advisor also connected me 
with one of the non-member inter-
viewees, a female master’s student 
the UGTT is a story of betrayal 
and maneuvering. From its sup-
port for Ben Ali’s candidacy in 
the elections of 2004 and 2009 
to social welfare reform, from 
the implementation of neoliber-
al economic measures to their 
abandoning of the Gafsa UGTT 
activists, jailed during the 2008 
uprising, when they limited 
themselves to a simple request 
for the release of the prisoners.16
The union’s alignment with the re-
gime marks a shift in the ideological 
posture of the UGTT; rather than 
advocate for its rank-and-file mem-
bers, the leadership rallied behind 
the top-down neoliberalism of Ben 
Ali.
     In many ways, the union seems 
far from the description of a mono-
lith. It is comprised of twenty-four 
regional unions, ninteen sector 
federations, and twenty-one  gen-
eral unions with a total of around 
750,000 members from all geo-
graphic areas of Tunisia.17 This re-
gional component of diversity is a 
widely celebrated attribute of the 
union that is rare for many civil so-
ciety organizations, which in turn 
fosters the public’s trust in the insti-
tution. Even so, in the Post-Democ-
racy Era there remains the question 
of how much the UGTT can truly 
accomplish on behalf of the worker, 
especially when the country faces 
difficult economic conditions.18 It 
is often credited for “stabilization” 
post-revolution and the prevention 
of total state control by the Islamic 
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Higher Institute of Design. He was 
elected as a basic member in 2006. 
Khelifa was involved in the princi-
pal syndicalist sector of higher ed-
ucation and continues to work in 
this capacity as of the publication 
date of this paper. He describes his 
work with the union as generally 
low-maintenance, with the excep-
tion of election periods and more 
charged political climates—the 
zenith of these being the political 
climate during the 2011 revolution. 
Labassi had no official role in the 
UGTT at the time of the interview, 
but had been involved at the highest 
levels of the organization since 2002. 
He became Vice Secretary General 
of the trade union of teachers and 
a member of the national council 
of trade union university teachers 
during his time of involvement be-
fore stepping down in 2014. He con-
tinued to work with the UGTT fol-
lowing 2014 as a consultant. 
2. Perception
     Khelifa began by qualifying his 
view of his membership: that it was 
beneficial “psychologically” but not 
“financially” (though he said that he 
enjoys it because of this reason).19 
He highlighted the importance and 
power of the union: when we talk 
about what strikes or movements 
can take place, the UGTT is quite 
important because it can decide the 
level of success due to its ties with 
influential people in the govern-
ment. Under the old regimes, the 
organization was not “too free to 
Research Findings
     I will present the interviews I 
conducted in two major parts. I will 
present the perspectives of those 
who were involved in the UGTT 
directly in order to give a deeper 
understanding of how the union 
operates. My goal during these in-
terviews was to understand the 
more logistical aspects of member-
ship and the structure of the union, 
and subsequently to inquire about 
the political reach and aims of the 
UGTT from the perspective of a cur-
rent and former member. Secondly, 
I will present interviews with those 
who were not directly involved in 
the union so as to present a more 
general discussion of the influence 
and power of the UGTT, even to 
those who are not directly impacted 
by it via membership. My primary 
objective during these interviews 
was to openly question the inter-
viewees about their experience or 
their thoughts regarding the UGTT 
from their respective positions.
Members
1. Involvement
     The first two interviews were with 
Youssef Khelifa, a lecturer at the 
Higher Institute of Design of Tunis, 
and Tahar Labassi, a linguistics pro-
fessor at the University of Tunis and 
also the former Chief of Staff of the 
Minister of the Department of Edu-
cation in Tunisia. Khelifa had made 
a request to become a member of the 
UGTT in 2005; in order to join, he 
had to win favor in elections at the 
tion, it seemed that FTDES, though 
its organizational history is much 
shorter, faced a similar dilemma as 
the UGTT insofar as it created both 
an avenue for people to organize 
and a simultaneous entrenchment 
of the status quo which allowed— 
and perhaps encouraged—this sort 
of sanctioned form of protest.
Concerns
     Of course, this study must not 
be taken as representative of the 
Tunisian public or be generalized 
to make assumptions beyond the 
scope of the paper. Rather, this 
study can be used to further gener-
al discussion on the efficacy of the 
UGTT and how it operates in the 
socio-political space of Tunisia’s 
democracy. Multiple factors served 
as ethical concerns in the process 
of this research. The existence of a 
short time-frame to complete the 
interviews, as well as an effective 
language barrier, made it difficult 
to recruit interviewees and/or set 
up times for interviews that would 
be convenient for the interviewee, 
myself, and possibly a translator if 
needed. Thus, I was largely reliant 
on existing contacts in the Tunis 
area to find possible interviewees, 
introducing bias in my sample in 
terms of region and, likely, social 
status. These same biases exist due 
to the fact that no Tunisians living 
in southern Tunisia were represent-
ed in this research, even though 
some interviewees were originally 
from the South. 
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advocate for workers, but now, it 
is more free”20 to conduct its work. 
Before the revolution under Ben Ali 
and Bourguiba, there were acts of 
violence and armed, bloody con-
flicts between the UGTT and the 
state. Now that democracy has been 
achieved, there is no longer this sort 
of conflict. Khelifa lamented the fact 
that, though the UGTT has more 
power, the workers of Tunisia are 
suffering more than they were be-
fore the revolution due to a horde of 
economic reasons.
     He discussed the ways in which 
there was “certainly a change [in 
the UGTT] especially with the new 
emergence of Islamist parties”21 
post-revolution. Here, he pointed to 
what he called the real function and 
strength of the UGTT: to defend and 
secure modernity for the country.22 
To Khelifa, the UGTT aims to pro-
tect and make a consensus between 
the Islamist and Modernist par-
ties. This is why, he said, the UGTT 
worked against the Islamists after 
the revolution in order to stabilize 
the country. The UGTT supported 
many of the uprising movements at 
the time, so the government had to 
take it seriously due to the weight 
of the organization. The leadership 
works with both labor and the gov-
ernment, but from Khelifa’s point of 
view, the first objective is always to 
protect workers’ rights.
     Labassi had a more critical per-
ception of the UGTT, which he at-
tributed to his former degree of 
involvement in and now relative 
freedom from the organization.23 
He described the union as the only 
space where real politics was pos-
sible under the Ben Ali regime, 
though it was always committed to 
the upholding of the state. He ad-
mitted that today there is a question 
of whether or not the organization 
is actually a hindrance. He also de-
scribed the nature of the UGTT’s 
negotiations with the government, 
which usually operates by dealing 
with ministers of various depart-
ments of government. These min-
isters would often sign agreements 
with the UGTT that would purport-
edly meet the demands of workers, 
but due to the high turnover rate of 
ministers they knew that the onus 
would fall on a successive minister 
and likely not be upheld. He did not 
place all the blame on this pattern, 
noting that the government is under 
great economic pressure due to a 
lack of means. However, the UGTT 
faces pressure itself from the work-
ing class as the economic situation 
worsens while the cost of living ris-
es. 
     Labassi’s main qualm with the 
UGTT was in its failure (or as he 
called it, refusal) to change post-rev-
olution. To him, changing means 
working as a trade union should 
work in a traditional democracy. 
He believed that the UGTT does 
not want to change because it is in 
a rather favorable position: it has an 
effective monopoly on unionism in 
the country.24 The government can-
not give other trade unions many 
rights; the UGTT has made it so 
that only its own organization can 
win any favor in the eyes of the 
government. Labassi pointed to the 
UGTT’s failure to support the ini-
tial protests for the 2011 revolution, 
which began in the south of Tuni-
sia. The union chose to side with the 
existing regime at the time. How-
ever, the UGTT is also not officially 
part of the government.25 It plays a 
quasi-governmental role, and this 
is likely where it prefers to stay, ac-
cording to Labassi. He believed that 
the union should embrace a role in 
national politics and move towards 
the path of official institutionaliza-
tion on the federal level.
Non-Members
1. Involvement
     I interviewed Lassaad Bouat-
tour, a civil servant working for the 
Ministry of Finance in Tunisia, and 
Rawe Khefi, a master’s student at the 
Université de Tunis el Manar with-
in the Higher Institute of Human 
Sciences. Khefi had a background 
in unionism in her undergradu-
ate years, though not through the 
UGTT. Neither had any direct rela-
tionship with the UGTT, meaning 
that they were not nor had ever been 
part of the union, and did not know 
anyone beyond the level of acquain-
tanceship who was involved with 
the union.
2. Perception
     Bouattour outlined his major 
thoughts via a short history of the 
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and criticized its passivity regarding 
politics particularly after the Quar-
tet period of 2014. For these reasons, 
she did not think the UGTT would 
become popular among her genera-
tion as an avenue for activism or as 
a movement.
Discussion and Analysis
     A certain repetition took place 
during the course of each interview, 
wherein the interviewee would feel 
it necessary to outline the history of 
the UGTT/Tunisia before beginning 
to describe their own perception 
of the institution and/or how they 
were involved. Each gave a simi-
lar story of Tunisia’s history since 
the colonial period, though each 
differed in their explanations of 
why certain movements proceeded 
while others failed (e.g. Gafsa riots 
in 2008 vs. the Kasbah protests of 
2011). This pattern made sense—it 
is difficult to say what exactly the 
UGTT is or does without discussing 
its history. The past of the UGTT is 
precisely why it is valued as an in-
stitution in the Tunisian collective 
consciousness today. Though all the 
interviewees had different political 
leanings, they followed some sim-
ilarities in their beliefs, especially 
that the government must contin-
ue on a secular path and that the 
UGTT was helpful in this endeavor. 
Each was concerned by the threat 
of major Islamic political and social 
forces, the most prominent being 
the Ennahda political party which 
won the highest percentage of votes 
ties would come from membership 
in the party. Ultimately, he lauded 
the UGTT for its role in stabilizing 
the government post-revolution, but 
believed that they should not take 
their activities too far in the politi-
cal or social realm in order for the 
country to be able to grow econom-
ically.
     Khefi held a significantly differ-
ent view of the UGTT as compared 
to Bouattour. As someone who has 
been involved in leftist political 
movements for years in Tunisia, she 
hesitated to refer to the UGTT with 
total positivity. She did echo some of 
the major popular sentiments, like 
how the union was forced to con-
form to the state’s demands under 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali. She pointed 
out that they were able to gain some 
power during the Bread Riots in 
which they faced violence due to the 
protests that they were involved in. 
Khefi felt that the union generally 
stood up for the people against the 
government, and that the people do 
not forget it . 
     However, she criticized the 
union for its failure to support the 
miners’ protests in Gafsa in 2008 
and the initial seeds of revolution-
ary protests as well. She praised its 
ability to prevent the Islamist par-
ties from gaining too much power 
after the revolution and said that it 
was clearly committed to upholding 
the “Tunisian way of life.”30 Funda-
mentally, Khefi saw the UGTT as re-
maining more pro-government than 
pro-people following the revolution, 
UGTT’s activity since Tunisia’s co-
lonial period. He acknowledged it 
had a strong effect in the turn of in-
dependence. The syndicalist move-
ment was threatening to the colonial 
powers—this, according to Bouat-
tour, is why Farhat Hached26  was 
assassinated, an act which immor-
talized the UGTT as a symbol for 
the national spirit.27 After indepen-
dence, he noted, the Neo-Destour 
party and the UGTT viewed them-
selves as co-managers of the coun-
try—while this led to some clashes, 
the sharing of power was largely 
peaceful. Ben Ali was more author-
itarian; Bouattour emphasized that 
the president was dealing with not 
one, but two major entities that often 
opposed him: the UGTT and the Is-
lamic Tendency Movement (MTI).28 
Ben Ali would pick sides between 
UGTT and Islamists when it was 
convenient. Around 1991, however, 
Ben Ali became more hostile to-
wards the UGTT, insisting that the 
union would need to operate on his 
terms and that he would choose the 
members of its leadership. 
     Bouattour became most critical 
of the union when discussing the 
education sector. As a father him-
self, he remarked that the UGTT’s 
education sector union is “an enemy 
of any mother/father in Tunisia,”29 
especially after mass strikes by ed-
ucation workers last year. He also 
said that, today, the main way to get 
power is through the UGTT, while 
under Ben Ali similar benefits such 
as wage increases or job opportuni-
VOL V || ISSUE I || FALL 2020
29
in the last parliamentary elections.31 
     The difficulty in assessing the 
UGTT is multifaceted. The organi-
zation has a long and diverse histo-
ry which makes it difficult to tie to 
a coherent ethos over time, partic-
ularly due to the various treatment 
it has faced under multiple regimes 
and the various ways it chose to act 
under these regimes. The aim of 
this study is to attempt to accurate-
ly assess the union on both its own 
terms and on the terms to which the 
people of Tunisia hold it. To catego-
rize it via a traditional left vs. right 
dichotomy or the basic movement 
of state actors as the abstraction of 
the citizenry would be a mistake, as 
some have done.32 This would ignore 
the entire basis of the union as well 
as a larger critique of power from 
perspectives outside of the bipolar 
political field.
     As some interviewees mentioned, 
the ability of the union has depend-
ed on the environment around it. 
For Khelifa and Labassi, the UGTT 
is a strong if not the strongest Tu-
nisian institution and should be 
strengthened in the democratic era 
in order to be even more effective. 
Labassi saw the union moving for-
ward as a political party and taking 
on the responsibility that comes 
with governance rather than need-
ing to negotiate as a civil society 
group. To Khefi, who identifies as a 
leftist, the UGTT did not do enough 
for the worker, and it was unclear at 
best whether the union is suited to 
take on the post-modern socioeco-
nomic problems which the youth 
of Tunisia distinctly face.33 Howev-
er, to Bouattour, the UGTT is too 
tyrannical in its measures to advo-
cate for workers’ wages. It is these 
conflicting narratives that make it 
necessary to remove the lens of elec-
toral politics in order to observe the 
kind of organization that the UGTT 
is, or appears to be. In this analysis, 
I valued the perception rather than 
some measure of “true” existence 
because of my interest in how the 
citizens of Tunisia view the strength 
of class movements. Further, it is 
unclear whether the UGTT can be 
objectively defined.34 My purpose 
was to explore the effect of power 
and proximity to the state in an ef-
fort to fight for workers via a union 
organization.
Barriers
     In addition to the aforementioned 
difficulties, if this research was to be 
continued and expanded, it would 
be helpful to be able to speak to cur-
rent members of the executive board 
of the UGTT. This allows for an ad-
ditional level of perception which 
would contextualize the union 
more directly. Further, it would be 
useful to gather perceptions from 
those outside of the Tunis area, par-
ticularly in regions such as Gafsa, 
Sidi Bouzid, Gabes, etc. where the 
2011 revolution began and where 
the socioeconomic conditions dif-
fer. An increase in interviews with 
the inclusion of more demograph-
ics would aid this research as well. 
Moreover, in all such interactions, 
the presence of a reliable transla-
tor (or the personal development 
of Tunisian Arabic/French fluency) 
would be extremely important to re-
duce as much of the language barrier 
as possible. A translator would also 
be advantageous for reading sources 
and texts relating to the UGTT.
Conclusion
     Though my collection of inter-
views were limited in quantity, they 
provided me with a wide range of 
perspectives on the UGTT. These 
perspectives should not be used 
to reflect the actual and exact sen-
timents of all Tunisian people to-
wards the union, but can be useful 
in a discourse regarding the UGTT 
and a broader discourse surround-
ing the ethics and efficacy of nation-
al unions. This allowed me to devel-
op a more extensive comprehension 
of how the union is perceived. The 
UGTT is in quite a unique posi-
tion, whether viewed as a nation-
al union, political institution, civil 
society group, etc. However, in the 
Post-Democratic era, the UGTT 
does not seem to use its advantag-
es to change the material conditions 
for workers—purchasing power is 
low, and social unrest is high. This 
begs the question: is the union pur-
posefully avoiding a more radical 
approach to maintain its power sta-
tus à la Michels’ Iron Law of Oligar-
chy,35 or does it believe that its strat-
egy is truly the most effective for its 
aims? These are vital questions that 
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of possibilities that the UGTT can 
either create for Tunisia, or hinder.
are highly relevant to the explora-
tion and imagination of the realm 
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high rates of infectious disease and 
malnutrition remain due to gross 
incompetence by former president 
Robert Mugabe, as well as continu-
ing economic hyperinflation and 
instability. Recurring authoritarian 
tendencies of current president Em-
merson Mnangagwa suggest that he 
is likely to repeat the same mistakes 
as Mugabe.
     Historically, the nation of Zim-
babwe has experienced detrimen-
tal setbacks since the creation of a 
state with adequate health resourc-
es. First colonized by the British 
empire as the colony of Rhodesia, 
Zimbabwe became an independent 
nation after a 1965 revolution led 
by the whitesettler class and their 
prime minister, Ian Smith. Under 
Smith’s rule, Black Zimbabweans 
suffered from “nutritional deficien-
cies, communicable diseases and 
problems associated with pregnan-
cy.”4 “Structures of racial domina-
tion”, which primarily consisted of 
government health spending in-
equality between Black-majority 
and White-majority areas of Zim-
babwe, reinforced racially-stratified 
patterns of disease.5 Private medical 
services, used primarily by White 
Zimbabweans, received nearly five 
times as much funding than public 
medical services in urban areas and 
roughly thirty-six times more fund-
ing than public medical services in 
rural areas.6 White minority rule oc-
curred in international isolation and 
continued until Robert Mugabe led 
the Black Zimbabwean majority in a 
civil war against the ruling govern-
ment in 1975. In 1983, Mugabe was 
successful over Smith’s regime and 
declared official independence for
Zimbabwe from the White Rhode-
sians.7
     In the 1980s, Mugabe and his 
government were able to construct 
a healthcare system in Zimbabwe 
that was considered a “model for 
Africa.”8 According to a 1990 report 
on health post-independence in 
Zimbabwe, the setting of a national 
In 2007, the lowest average fe-male life expectancy in the world was Zimbabwe, at just 
thirty-four years of age.1 Howev-
er, over the span of the last decade 
the estimated female life expectancy 
has risen to sixty-foour years.2 From 
these measures, we can assume 
that the quality of life for Zimba-
bweans has significantly improved 
in the last decade, yet quantitative 
data does not paint the entire pic-
ture. Today Zimbabwe remains the 
eighth highest Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus (HIV)-prevalent 
nation in the world, despite a drop 
from twenty-nine to fifteen percent 
in the infection rate since its peak in 
1997.3 A full understanding of the 
seriousness of Zimbabwe’s health 
crisis requires examination of the 
history of Zimbabwe, changes in 
its political leadership, and govern-
mental response to various disease 
outbreaks. While Zimbabwean life 
expectancy and health outcomes 
have improved since the 2007 lows, 
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minimum wage was the most im-
portant reform made under Mug-
abe to positively influence health.9 
Other important policy changes 
included subsidies on basic food, 
expansion of public schools, free 
health care provided for those mak-
ing below the minimum wage, the 
creation of more rural health facil-
ities, increased commitment to the 
vaccination of major childhood dis-
eases, and the formation of specified 
national departments to address 
malnutrition and diarrheal diseas-
es.10 The report concluded that these 
health improvements “removed the 
worst nutritional and communica-
ble disease effects of a settler colonial 
state”, and that this new health sys-
tem showed “national commitment 
towards destroying the old order 
of racist and undemocratic health 
care institutions.”11 While trends of 
health funding disparities between 
rural and urban areas during the 
1980s remain ingrained in govern-
ment health policy, Mugabe’s re-
forms saw significant improvement 
to healthcare under former ruler Ian 
Smith. Proper maintenance of the 
national healthcare system contin-
ued into the 1990s, until political 
instability and economic failure in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s led to 
the system’s downturn. 
     In 2000, Mugabe began encour-
aging land invasions of White farms 
in order to scapegoat the remain-
ing White population for economic 
problems in Zimbabwe and consol-
idate a majority within his party.12 
The invasions created instability and 
rendered farming impossible, which 
in turn triggered “a humanitarian 
crisis in which more than half of the 
population needed food aid.”13 Gov-
ernment land redistribution pro-
grams under Mugabe failed to pro-
vide land invaders with the proper 
tools and materials needed to farm, 
resulting in a ninety percent de-
crease in the production of corn and 
wheat. The collapse of productivity 
in these farms, as well as gross cor-
ruption within the Mugabe regime, 
caused sustained hyperinflation, 
which plagues the Zimbabwean 
economy to this day.14 As Zimba-
bwe’s economy contracted, Mugabe 
began to experience more feelings of 
political vulnerability and lashed out 
at any group he viewed as his oppo-
sition. Attacks by Mugabe’s “Youth 
Militias” against doctors providing 
treatment for political opposition 
members caused thousands of doc-
tors to flee Zimbabwe. In 2008, only 
twenty-five percent of positions 
for doctors were filled in the state 
health system due to fear of political 
oppression. Inflation also made con-
ditions for doctors who remained 
in Zimbabwe more dangerous, as 
most hospitals were no longer able 
to provide healthcare professionals 
with adequate amounts of gloves or 
sanitized equipment, putting them 
at higher risk of contracting blood-
borne diseases such as HIV.15
     HIV remains one of the most 
pressing and harmful medical cri-
ses in Zimbabwe. As of 2017, HIV/
AIDS is the leading cause of death 
and disability in Zimbabwe, with 
a prevalence rate of 12.7 percent 
among adults.16 While Zimbabwe 
has the ninth highest HIV death rate 
on the planet, significant improve-
ments have been made in decreasing 
infection counts in the last decade. 
In 2008, Zimbabwe experienced the 
peak of its HIV/AIDS crisis, with a 
total national adult prevalence of 33 
percent. Death rates were worsened 
by a lack of access to antiretroviral 
drugs, as the government was not 
able to consistently produce these 
medications. The limited drugs 
available were oftentimes distribut-
ed to Mugabe regime loyalists and 
army officers of the ruling Zimba-
bwe African National Union- Patri-
otic Front (ZANU-PF) Party, which 
forced hundreds of HIV-positive 
Zimbabweans to travel to Mozam-
bique to receive antiretrovirals. 
Mugabe’s dictatorial governing style 
also reduced the amount of inter-
national aid received in Zimbabwe 
to combat the crisis.17 While many 
Southern African countries received 
loans totaling upwards of $150 mil-
lion from the World Bank in 2004 to 
finance HIV treatment, Zimbabwe 
received only $4 million. The Global 
Fund to fight AIDS also rejected the 
majority of Zimbabwe’s funding
proposals of the same year.18
     Social stigma is another factor 
that worsens the burden of HIV 
in Zimbabwe, particularly for the 
LGBTQ+ population. Beginning 
in the late 1990s, during Mugabe’s 
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period of political fragility, he con-
tinually condemned homosexuality 
as a “repugnant offense.”19 Mugabe’s 
statements contributed to the exist-
ing taboos surrounding homosexu-
ality in Zimbabwean society, which 
created more barriers to HIV care 
for LGBTQ+ populations in Zimba-
bwe. A 2017 study by Jennifer Hunt 
found that LGBTQ+ Zimbabweans 
and sex workers in Zimbabwe are 
adversely impacted by doctors’ in-
accurate perceptions of their sexual 
and gender identity, where “equal 
access to care” is “dependent on 
conforming to ‘sexual norms’.”20 One 
lesbian woman even described that 
doctors were “afraid to touch” her 
when giving care.21 While HIV is a 
significant challenge for people of all 
walks of life in Zimbabwe, cultural 
prejudices against LGBTQ+ gender 
and sexual identities by healthcare 
providers remain a significant chal-
lenge to this marginalized popula-
tion.
     Reduction in HIV prevalence 
rates since 2007 is mainly unasso-
ciated with government interven-
tion. Experts claim that communi-
ty-based behavior change primarily 
accounts for the reduction of HIV 
infection, as many adults between 
the ages of twenty and twenty-five 
delay sexual activity in response to 
the high death and infection rates.22 
One government policy success 
came from an initiative known as 
the “National Prevention of Mother 
to Child Transmission Program.” In 
2004, the government expanded the 
production of antiretroviral drugs, 
specifically for HIV-positive moth-
ers. This intervention proved to be 
successful, as infant mortality de-
creased from 102 deaths per 1000 
births to 82 deaths per 1000 births 
by 2006.23 Recent estimates show a 
continued positive trend in infant 
mortality from lowering of moth-
er-to-child HIV transmission rates, 
with a predicted infant mortality of 
56 deaths per 1000 births in 2017.24
     Tuberculosis (TB) persists as 
another significant factor in the 
causation of negative health out-
comes in Zimbabwe. TB is the third 
highest cause of death and the sec-
ond highest cause of premature 
death in the nation.25 Compared to 
the rest of the world, Zimbabwe has 
the highest TB infection rate per cap-
ita. HIV infection is a risk factor in 
the contraction of TB, as nearly sev-
enty-five percent of people with TB 
in Zimbabwe are also infected with 
HIV. The increase in the prevalence 
of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis 
(MDR TB) in Zimbabwe has made 
the persistence of this disease more 
difficult to combat. Government in-
attention to MDR TB surveillance 
is correlated with the decline of the 
national healthcare infrastructure, 
as oversight of MDR TB infection 
was last performed by the Zimba-
bwean government in 1995. In a 
2012 study on TB cases in hospitals 
in the capital of Harare, nearly one-
fourth of TB patients were infected 
with MDR TB. While the study only 
analyzed a small sample of eighty-
four patients, the researchers stated 
the urgency of “a comprehensive 
response” to MDR TB by the Zim-
babwean government, as the preva-
lence of MDR TB nationally could 
be even higher than in this sample.26
     In addition to ongoing tuber-
culosis outbreaks, the persistence 
of cholera reveals the ineptitude of 
Zimbabwean political leaders in ad-
dressing health crises. In 2008, an 
outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe 
resulted in nearly 100,000 cases and 
more than 4,000 deaths over a pe-
riod of ten months.27 The epidemic 
was worsened by the politicization 
of sanitation infrastructure by the 
ZANU-PF party. After the oppo-
sition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) party won numer-
ous majorities in the 2005 parlia-
mentary elections, ruling ZANU-PF 
politicians nationalized munici-
pal water supply in areas of MDC 
support. Consequently, the price 
of accessing water rose and sanita-
tion infrastructure was neglected in 
these areas, particularly in  Harare. 
As sanitation systems deteriorat-
ed, cholera-inducing bacteria grew 
in the water supply. The neglect of 
water supply continued even after 
the onset of the 2008 epidemic, and 
Harare’s water supply was cut off in 
November 2008. Zimbabwe’s health 
system was also under strain during 
the outbreak, due to Mugabe’s fail-
ure to acknowledge the severity of 
the crisis. Rather than making a call 
for international donations to ad-
dress cholera when cases were con-
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firmed in Harare, Mugabe waited for 
four months, claiming publicly that 
there was “no cholera in Zimbabwe” 
even after his health minister had 
declared a crisis.28 Despite an official 
end to the epidemic in 2009, doctors 
in Harare report that the city still ex-
periences regular outbreaks of chol-
era due to lack of maintenance of 
sewage and water infrastructure.29
     Since the 2008 epidemic, mass 
vaccination campaigns have been 
the Zimbabwean government’s pri-
mary policy solution to the recur-
ring threat of cholera. Zimbabwe’s 
Ministry of Health declared another 
cholera outbreak in 2018 in Hara-
re, totaling 8535 total cases and fif-
ty deaths. While the severity of the 
crisis was significantly less than the 
2008 epidemic, poor management 
of water infrastructure by the mu-
nicipal government remained the 
primary causal factor. A vaccination 
campaign began in Harare and the 
surrounding region soon after the 
declaration of the outbreak, where 
over 2.7 million vaccines were pro-
duced for two rounds of the cam-
paign. With support from the World 
Health Organization, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund, Oxfam, 
and other non-governmental orga-
nizations, the government was able 
to construct four cholera treatment 
centers in Harare and distribute 
sanitation and other non-food items 
to impacted areas.30 Government 
response was more rapid and effi-
cient than during the 2008 epidem-
ic. The mass vaccination campaign 
in 2018 occurred less than a month 
after the first cases were discovered, 
while in 2008, Mugabe did not even 
acknowledge there was an epidemic 
after his own health minister stated 
so. Timely acknowledgement of the 
crisis also allowed the government 
to quickly appeal for international 
aid, which likely mitigated the nega-
tive health consequences of the out-
break in comparison to 2008.     
     Environmental disasters have only 
worsened Zimbabwe’s public health 
crisis response. In March 2019, Cy-
clone Idai ravaged Southern Africa 
and displaced thousands of people 
in the region. A consequence of 
cyclone-induced flooding was the 
possibility of the return of cholera 
after the outbreak just a year ear-
lier, as well as other infectious dis-
eases prevalent in Zimbabwe such 
as typhoid fever and malaria.31 The 
government began another mass 
vaccination campaign for cholera 
in April 2019 primarily targeting 
the most severely affected districts 
of Chimanimani and Chipinge. In-
ternational aid was utilized once 
again, as United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), the Wolrd Health 
Organization (WHO), Doctors 
Without Borders, and the Red Cross 
were instrumental in the creation of 
nearly one million doses of the oral 
vaccine, which were administered 
in two rounds to grant full immu-
nity to recipients of the vaccine.32 
One difficulty in vaccine adminis-
tration was that rural road networks 
that connected the districts of Chi-
manimani and Chipinge to the rest 
of Zimbabwe were decimated from 
flooding after the cyclone. In order 
to deliver the vaccines to the dis-
tricts, public health officials had to 
use helicopters, and were limited to 
only thirty minutes on the ground 
for each of the target areas.33 These 
challenges highlight the continu-
ing urban-rural disparity that exists 
regarding access to healthcare ser-
vices.
     At the onset of independence, the 
Mugabe regime prioritized maternal 
and child healthcare improvement. 
During Zimbabwe’s colonial era, 
maternal malnutrition was extreme-
ly prevalent, as it contributed to “low 
birth weight in ten to twenty percent 
of all births”, causing newborns to 
be more vulnerable to “more severe 
and often fatal infections.”34 After 
the creation of the national primary 
care program in 1980, the maternal 
mortality rate fell by twenty-eight 
percent by 1983.35 While post-in-
dependence maternal health gains 
were significant during the 1980s, 
they quickly eroded as economic 
hyperinflation and ruthless author-
itarian leadership plagued Zimba-
bwe from the late 1990s onwards. 
According to a 2010 demographic 
survey in Zimbabwe, “maternal and 
child health has stagnated in recent 
years”, with stalling or downturn of 
the child mortality rate since the 
mid-2000s.36 High rates of malaria 
and HIV are significant burdens on 
the health of mothers in Zimbabwe. 
A 2003 report on maternal health 
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in Northern Zimbabwe implicated 
malaria and HIV in the high rates of 
“preterm delivery, low birth weight, 
stillbirth, or neonatal mortality.”37 
While the researchers recommend-
ed the use of antimalarial and an-
tiretroviral treatments to address 
the possibility of mother-to-child 
transmission of these diseases, the 
Zimbabwean government has not 
been able to produce these medica-
tions on a consistent basis, mainly 
due to the costs of production in a 
state of economic hyperinflation.38
     Compared to the rest of sub-Sa-
haran and northern Africa, Zimba-
bwe is an outlier in negative health 
outcomes due to its high HIV death 
and prevalence rates, as well as the 
continuing pervasiveness of vac-
cinatable diseases such as TB and 
cholera. Within Africa, only the na-
tions of South Africa, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Zambia, and Kenya surpass 
or compare to Zimbabwe in the in-
fection count and death rate of HIV, 
according to 2018 estimates.39 Even 
in comparison with the handful of 
nations that are on par with Zimba-
bwe in HIV counts, Zimbabwe leads 
the world in TB deaths and TB-in-
duced disability. While Zimbabwe 
was viewed as a progressive African 
state in the 1980s due to its health-
care model and improvements in 
disease and maternal health out-
comes, rapid decline of medical 
infrastructure places Zimbabwe far 
above world averages in infection 
and death count for highly prevent-
able and treatable diseases. 
     After close inspection of Zimba-
bwe’s major health problems men-
tioned in this paper, several trends 
emerge to cause these difficulties. 
The main explanation for Zimba-
bwe’s health woes is continued in-
attention and strain placed upon 
the once-advanced national health 
program, primarily by former pres-
ident Robert Mugabe. During his 
peak of political fragility in the early 
to mid-2000s, inducing attacks on 
doctors by youth militias, the lack of 
doctors in Zimbabwe was so signif-
icant that there were “only 800 reg-
istered doctors in the country.”40 A 
lack of doctors impacts all areas of 
health, and legacies of this problem 
exist in all sectors of healthcare in 
Zimbabwe today. Mugabe’s pattern 
of politicizing and downplaying dis-
ease emergencies, such as the 2008 
cholera epidemic and the 2007 HIV 
crisis, worsened the effects of these 
incidents and reduced the potential 
for receiving significant aid dona-
tions from international organiza-
tions. Economic mismanagement 
and corruption occurring under the 
watch of Mugabe also exacerbated 
the intense downturn of healthcare. 
Continuing hyperinflation has led 
to difficulties in government pro-
duction of medications for HIV and 
malaria. Financial distress also con-
tributes to the decline of the nation-
al education system, which has in 
turn limited the training of doctors 
in Zimbabwe to address shortages. 
Only time will tell if future leaders 
can overcome the disastrous health 
legacy that Mugabe created.  
     Moving forward, it will be up to 
the political leadership of recently 
elected president Emmerson Mnan-
gagwa to determine if Zimbabwe 
will see improvements in health 
outcomes. Upon election, Mnan-
gagwa’s promise to the Zimbabwean 
people was that he would take the 
country in “a new direction.”41 In his 
first three years of president, Mnan-
gagwa has only accomplished this 
objective to a limited degree. Since 
promising to change the autocratic 
nature of the presidency in Zimba-
bwe, Mnangagwa “continues to pre-
vent and violently suppress political 
protests” and keep the media “heav-
ily biased in favor of the ruling par-
ty.”42 Many Zimbabweans even view 
Mnangagwa’s governing style as 
even more repressive than Mugabe, 
as more than twenty citizens have 
been killed and over 1,000 arrested 
since the beginning of Mnangagwa’s 
rule. These killings are especially 
concerning because Mnangagwa al-
ready resembles Mugabe at the end 
of his rule, despite being just barely 
three years into his first term. Eco-
nomic reforms have also been few 
and far between, with “a brief gov-
ernment surplus” and “the intro-
duction of a new currency aimed 
at curbing inflation” serving as the 
only significant changes made since 
Mnangagwa took power.43 Current-
ly the Zimbabwean economy is
close to entering a total state of dis-
repair, with shortages and basic re-
sources that resemble the economic 
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crisis in the early 2000s, according 
to political scientist Andrew Noy-
es.44 The COVID-19 pandemic is 
also likely to place pressure on the 
continually strained healthcare sys-
tem in Zimbabwe, especially with 
the high population of HIV-posi-
tive, immunosuppressed people in 
the country. Without any promise 
of commitment to improving the 
national healthcare infrastructure, 
it seems that president Mnangag-
wa will continue the same trend of 
complete disregard for healthcare as 
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Soviet collective memory meant to 
legitimize control and unify its peo-
ple. Decades later, the collapse of 
communism challenged the monu-
ments’ purpose by extinguishing the 
ideology they originally memorial-
ized. In examining the post-com-
munist and contemporary contexts 
of the memorials, this paper intends 
to answer how the Soviet Union is 
memorialized in Berlin. 
 Ideology, wartime experience, 
and symbolic location were signifi-
cant factors contributing to the So-
viet decision to erect war memorials 
in Berlin. The fierce rivalry between 
communism and fascism had a pro-
found impact on twentieth century 
European affairs. From an outsider’s 
lens in the 1920s, fascism and com-
munism seemed remarkably similar. 
Seizures of power in Italy, Germany, 
and the Soviet Union occurred with-
in years of one another.2 They also 
appeared to share totalitarian ruling 
styles, manipulating the masses and 
violently suppressing dissent.3 
 However, substantial ideological 
differences drove communism and 
fascism against one another domes-
tically. Each party’s extreme beliefs 
generated polarization and a “revo-
lutionary rivalry.”4 To demonstrate 
their ideological superiority, states 
enacted measures to undermine 
their ideological rivals. Examples 
include Mussolini’s ban on the Ital-
ian Communist Party in 1926 and 
widespread use of propaganda.5 On 
the international stage, this rival-
ry was not immediate, as relations 
remained cordial for some time. 
Nonetheless, steps taken internal-
ly to quash rival ideologies laid the 
Berlin has a tumultuous past, having been the capital of Prussia and the German em-
pire before the democratic Weimar 
Republic, overtaken by Nazi Ger-
many, followed by the Iron Curtain’s 
divide, and finally a unified mod-
ern Germany. Berlin’s public space 
reflects its volatile history.1 Street 
names, buildings, and monuments 
document the rise and fall of Ger-
many over the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. 
 In the wake of the Second World 
War, the Soviet Union constructed 
three memorials honoring fallen 
Red Army soldiers in Berlin. The 
intention was to impose messages 
of victory, sacrifice, and ideological 
superiority onto the German pop-
ulation. They also celebrated the 
idealized “Great Patriotic War” – a 
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framework for later external con-
flict.  
 Though government control 
quelled internal challenges to pow-
er, external security concerns exac-
erbated tensions in three instances. 
First, Adolph Hitler’s ascent to pow-
er in the 1930s frightened Soviet 
leaders. It showed the Soviets that 
fascism would not limit itself to de-
veloping states and pushed them to 
seek more collective security.6 The 
Soviet view of fascism’s expansion-
ary desires reinforced their percep-
tion of Hitler as an existential threat. 
Second, the Spanish Civil War was 
the first example of direct struggle 
between communists and fascists. 
The Soviets displayed aversion to 
war by electing not to match Ger-
man and Italian intervention for 
fear of further escalating violence.7  
 Finally, the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact of 1939 revealed different lev-
els of understanding and trust. Hit-
ler believed the Pact attained Sovi-
et neutrality in German affairs, but 
Stalin interpreted it more deeply,as 
an opportunity to expand territo-
ry without provoking Germany.8 
Nonetheless, Hitler regarded Soviet 
expansion into Southeastern Eu-
rope as a threat and this contribut-
ed to the German invasion of 1941.9 
Despite the agreement to divide 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union 
and Germany watched each other 
carefully, wary of the other gaining 
more power. 
 Fueled by security concerns, 
rampant propaganda exacerbated 
ideological tensions and heightened 
competition between Soviet com-
munists and German and Italian 
fascists. The German invasion of 
the Soviet Union brought the rivalry 
to war. A long four years of savage 
fighting constituted the ultimate test 
to determine the superior ideology. 
 The German justification for in-
vading the Soviet Union reveals the 
ideological intention to wage war 
against communist society. Weh-
rmacht Lieutenant-General Otto 
Lancelle explained to his soldiers in 
1941 that they would be fighting the 
war of “National Socialism against 
Bolshevism,” to defeat Soviet “de-
struction of the world… and cul-
tural assets.”10 German commanders 
described the “conflict of two Welt-
anschauungen” (roughly translated 
as “ideology”) as Germany’s “fight 
for survival” and “defense of Euro-
pean culture.”11This language con-
veys the perception of an alarming 
communist threat. The incorpora-
tion of ideology emphasizes its no-
tability in rationalizing war. 
 Emboldened by ideological rhet-
oric, the Eastern Front was marked 
by extreme brutality. German mili-
tary doctrine called for decisive vic-
tory achieved by rapid mobilization 
and annihilation of enemy forces.12 
Understanding the Soviet advantag-
es of fighting on their own ground, 
greater manpower, and more re-
sources, the Germans attacked full 
throttle and destroyed everything in 
their path.13 The Soviets matched the 
Wehrmacht’s cruelty through con-
ventional and partisan resistance. 
Despite the quick German advance, 
Soviet soldiers were known to fight 
to the last man.14 In one particu-
lar instance of such “underhanded 
methods,” a unit pretended to be 
dead and attacked a German group 
from behind, inflicting 90 casual-
ties.15 Underlying ideological impli-
cations translated into exceptional 
displays of determination. 
 The Germans proved no less harsh 
off the battlefield, seeking to destroy 
communist society. Wehrmacht sol-
diers willingly participated in atroc-
ities against Soviet civilians, like  “… 
the plundering of foodstuffs and the 
resulting starvation of Soviet civil-
ians… and a ruthless anti-partisan 
policy that resulted in the deaths 
of large numbers of alleged “gueril-
las.”16 The Eastern Front was much 
more than two states fighting one 
another for material resources or 
control of land – it decided which 
ideology was superior. 
 The Soviets repulsed the inva-
sion and defeated the Germans, 
though at an astronomical price. 
The war’s human cost amounted to 
25-35 million Soviets, an estimated 
two-thirds of which were civilians.17 
The war devastated infrastructure, 
destroying 70,000 towns, 6 million 
homes, 32,000 factories, and thou-
sands of miles of roads and railroad 
tracks. The unimaginably destruc-
tive Battle of Stalingrad exemplified 
Soviet resistance through “street by 
street, house by house, sometimes 
room by room” defense. Years later, 
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the war would connote the battle to 
survivors, recalling it before other 
memories. 
 The Soviet victory over Germany 
brought several significant conse-
quences. First, the Soviets perceived 
it as a demonstration of commu-
nist superiority to fascism, helping 
to consolidate fully and legitimize 
the Soviet regime in the eyes of the 
people it governed. Furthermore, 
it demonstrated the utility of pro-
paganda, depicting the “other” as a 
“perpetual foil.” Using “the other” 
boosted morale during the war and 
would later prove crucial in uniting 
people around the Soviet victory in 
the so-called Great Patriotic War. 
The totality of victory – not only re-
pelling invasion to pre-war borders 
but capturing the German capital – 
permitted the Soviet imposition of 
policy, ideology, and war narrative 
onto the German population. The 
war, as remembered by the Soviets, 
had a profound impact on the plan-
ning of memorials in Berlin. 
 Berlin’s symbolic status as a cap-
ital city compounded the meaning 
of Soviet memorialization. Capitals 
have historically gained significant 
status for their political, economic, 
and cultural prominence.18 This hi-
erarchical status granted the capital 
a significant role in communicating 
“desired meanings” through dis-
plays of social, political, and cultural 
control.19 To outside states, capitals 
became symbolic of the whole state 
and a target for invasion.20 It was 
largely the cultural function which 
signified capitals. 
 The Nazi Party’s imposition of 
ideology was evident through its 
transformation of Berlin and cer-
emonies in the interwar period. 
Hitler communicated the “national 
identity” of the new German state 
in Berlin by combining architec-
tural style and grandeur to denote 
modernization, authoritarianism, 
and intimidation.21 Rituals and pa-
rades added to the expression of 
Nazi identity.22 Berlin’s transforma-
tion heightened its representation 
of the Nazi ideology, implying its 
termination with the Soviet capture 
of Berlin in 1945. The dominance of 
Berlin added substantial meaning to 
Soviet monuments. 
 The Soviet memorials in Berlin 
serve a similar purpose in imposing 
Soviet sacrifice, victory, and superi-
ority, though they do so in different 
ways. The quick construction, mili-
taristic aspects, and central location 
in Tiergarten reflect the prominent 
role of Soviet sacrifice in Allied vic-
tory. The delicate artistic methodol-
ogy of the Treptower and Pankow 
memorials create a shared educa-
tional theme through inscriptions, 
architecture, and location. The 
grandeur and active use of the Trep-
tower monument add messages in 
celebrating liberation and heroism. 
 The rapid and grand construction 
of the Tiergarten memorial sends 
a clear message of dominance. The 
Red Army began building three 
months after the war and finished 
three months later.23 The New York 
Herald Tribune wrote that the 
Tiergarten memorial was the larg-
est monument in Berlin during its 
building.24 Though unconfirmed, 
the statement expressed the wide-
spread perception of a grandiose 
and impressive undertaking. About 
2,000 Red Army soldiers are buried 
on the grounds, out of 80,000 who 
died in the Battle of Berlin.25 The 
monument’s spectacle, size, and de-
tail is utterly disproportionate to the 
commemoration of approximate-
ly 2.5% of fallen Soviets during the 
Battle of Berlin. Doing so in a city 
still laying in ruins suggests Soviet 
postwar priorities in promoting its 
dominance.  
 When visiting, observers first no-
tice the Tiergarten memorial’s heavy 
weapons.26 Two T-34 tanks, among 
the first to arrive in Berlin in 1945 
with the Red Army, are placed to the 
right and left.27 Behind them sit the 
two artillery pieces the Red Army 
used to proclaim the Battle of Ber-
lin’s conclusion.28 Placing the weap-
ons at a prevalent, forward position 
draws the viewer’s attention to the 
militaristic aspects, and reminds the 
observer of Soviet military domi-
nance. 
 The Tiergarten memorial derives 
the most significance from its loca-
tion. Positioned in the British sector 
after the war suggests an intention 
to communicate with Western audi-
ences. To its Western wartime allies, 
the memorial emphasized the Soviet 
necessity to victory over Nazism. It 
also reminded West Berliners that 
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they too had been defeated by the 
Red Army. The memorial stands on 
the busy Straße des 17. Juni, ensur-
ing that it would serve as an every-
day reminder to its Western passers-
by. 
 Additionally, it was a symbolic 
spot in Nazi “Germania” plans of 
reconstructing the city according 
to the new ideology. Adolph Hitler 
and Albert Speer, the chief architect, 
intended to build the Nazi “victory 
avenue” in the same spot.29 Selecting 
this location as a “literal barrier” to 
Nazi triumph was a communist ex-
pression of ideological superiority 
to fascism.30
 The Tiergarten monument posi-
tion in the middle of other Berlin 
landmarks exemplifies the Soviet 
imprint on history. The Branden-
burg Gate, an eighteenth-century 
tribute to peace, and the Bundestag, 
where the iconic Reichstag stood, 
are within a few minutes’ walk. The 
Berlin Victory Column, a commem-
oration of Prussian unification, sits a 
mile west along Straße des 17. Juni. 
This sector, dense with monuments, 
memorialized significant periods of 
German and Berlin history.31 The 
Soviet memorial’s addition to the 
already defined space forces the in-
clusion of Soviet victory into the city 
and country’s commemoration. 
 The delicate methodology of the 
Treptower and Pankow memori-
als comprise an educative purpose 
through location, inscriptions, and 
architecture. Positioned in East Ber-
lin, the audiences for these monu-
ments differed from that of Tiergar-
ten. They were built in 1949, giving 
Soviet planners time to carefully 
craft every aspect to communicate 
specific messages.  Monumental 
inscriptions suggest a message of 
education. The entrances at Trep-
tower and Pankow are marked with 
phrases in Russian on one side and 
German on the other, including 
a German translation invites the 
German populace to understand 
the Soviet message. By contrast, the 
Tiergarten memorial itself is only 
in Russian, save for an English in-
scription on the side. The effect of 
mirroring the German and Russian 
is symbolic in expressing the impor-
tance of reformation to the Soviets. 
The purpose of reeducating German 
visitors is key to the Soviet emphasis 
on maintaining East Germany as an 
ally. 
 Located in peripheral spots out-
side the center city, visitors must go 
out of their way to view these two 
memorials. Unlike the Tiergarten 
memorial, located on a busy street, 
East Germans would have to make 
an intended effort to visit. Planners 
emphasized this idea of a pilgrimage 
in the architectural layouts. Both 
memorials are narrow shaped with 
the only entrances on one extreme 
end. The unique arrangement forc-
es the observer to view the memo-
rials in a particular viewpoint. As 
one enters, they immediately see the 
main sculpture of each monument. 
As they walk toward the monu-
ment, successive features become 
pronounced and impact the per-
spective as they approach the main 
sculpture. Leaders manipulated the 
layouts to enhance the memorials’ 
educative features. 
 Non-militaristic features com-
municate messages through inscrip-
tions and memorial layouts. The 
Pankow and Treptower memorials 
include a statue of Mother Home-
land, a figure mourning the death 
of her son.32 They both include 16 
tombs to commemorate the sacri-
fice of each Soviet republic.33 The ex-
clusion of weapons and prominence 
of death emphasizes the sorrow of 
these sites. In conjunction with edu-
cating the German population, they 
highlight the war’s human toll. 
 To a greater degree than the Trep-
tower memorial, however, Soviet 
leaders focused on the total war-
time cost in the Pankow memorial. 
The site was an area where families 
would enjoy recreational activity in 
the nineteenth century before be-
coming a labor camp during World 
War II. Resembling a cemetery, the 
Pankow memorial carries on this 
theme of gloom. On its ground 
are the remains of over 13,000 Red 
Army soldiers, serving as the larg-
est Soviet burial site in Berlin.34 The 
names of thousands who fell in the 
Battle of Berlin are chiseled into 
stone, producing a sense of guilt for 
German visitors.35
 The main feature of Pankow is 
Mother Homeland, shown crying 
about the loss of her son in com-
bat with a flag of victory – again, 
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reminding the German audience 
of the great Soviet victory. She sits 
atop a pedestal with the words “Not 
in vain was the death and the flow-
ing blood of the Soviet soldiers. 
Not in vain the sorrow and tears of 
the grieving mothers, widow and 
orphans. They call to fight for the 
eternal peace among all people.”36 
The imagery is another evocation of 
guilt for the Germans, attempting 
to convey the losses of the Soviet 
masses during the war to the Ger-
man audience. As the main point of 
the monument Mother Homeland 
emits a somber tone for the me-
morial as a whole. These carefully 
planned features encourage remorse 
in the visitor. 
The Treptower site concentrates 
on ideological superiority through 
symbols of liberation and triumph. 
The design’s background illustrates 
ideological themes. The Soviet ad-
ministration held a competition 
open to Germans and Soviets for 
designs of the memorial in 1946.37 
The inclusion of German planners 
encouraged the participation of the 
populace in re-education efforts. 
Competition criteria were com-
memorating fallen Soviets in the 
Battle of Berlin and expressing the 
reason for their sacrifice, defined as 
the “international liberation mission 
of the Soviet Army.”38 The message 
of liberation is twofold: it reminds 
Germans of its past oppressive sys-
tem, while expressing Soviet victory 
in defeating this institution.  
 The artistic features tell the So-
viet story of liberation. The sixteen 
sarcophagi lining the sides each 
have bas-relief works accompanied 
by text, which tell a story as an ob-
server walks from one to the next. It 
shows Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet 
Union, explaining that the German 
intention was to destroy the Sovi-
et people through enslavement or 
death.39 Emphasizing the German 
invasion, the monument depicts the 
Soviets as innocent, having been 
forced to fight for their own free-
dom. This depiction reflects a nar-
row interpretation of ideological 
battle based on moral superiority. It 
is important that the bas-reliefs have 
“no direct reference” to the German 
people because it avoid blaming the 
German audience and invites them 
to join the “anti-facist resistance sto-
ry.”40 
 The towering Red Army soldier 
contrasts the subtle bas-reliefs by 
acting as the memorial’s clear cen-
terpiece. He stands heroically with a 
long sword in one hand, small child 
in the other arm, and stomps on a 
swastika. The liberation message is 
clear as the child clings to him for 
protection. The popular Great Patri-
otic War narrative predicates on this 
message of liberation. The Treptow-
er memorial, specifically the Red 
Army statue, came to embody the 
war cult.41
 The Soviets and East Germans 
employed the Treptower site for 
political purposes. Physically, the 
monument covers an expansive 
area of nearly a square kilometer.42 
While the size exhibits grandeur in 
itself, communist ideologues used 
it for celebrations of Victory Day 
and Liberation Day.43 The function-
al use is consistent with the Great 
Patriotic War mindset that “no one 
is forgotten, nothing is forgotten,” 
deriving meaning from past suffer-
ing.44 Holding celebratory events 
there gave it an active role, continu-
ally imposing the idea of liberation. 
Although communicating different 
messages, the Soviet memorials in 
Tiergarten, Pankow, and Treptower 
advanced a common postwar Soviet 
agenda. 
Post-Communism
 The interpretations of the Sovi-
et war memorials in Berlin have 
changed significantly over time. 
Originally, intentions were rooted 
in the events of the Second World 
War, aimed at educating the Ger-
man population on the Soviet nar-
rative, commemorating sacrifice, 
and reminding the Western Allies of 
the indispensable wartime role. As 
Europe settled into division in what 
would be called the Cold War, Berlin 
became a flashpoint and microcosm 
of greater struggle. The messages of 
these monuments shifted with re-
gional and world developments. Af-
ter the fall of communism many in 
Eastern Europe viewed Soviet me-
morials as symbols of domination 
and suppression, a sentiment many 
continue to harbor today. In recent 
years, Vladimir Putin’s leadership 
has revived Russia’s regional and 
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global position in part by adopt-
ing Soviet strategies. This trend has 
renewed disagreements about the 
meaning of Soviet symbols. 
 The complex politics of remem-
brance swept through Eastern Eu-
rope in the wake of communist col-
lapse. Street names and monuments 
in Berlin were caught in the cross-
hairs of contentious debate as the 
population grappled with interpret-
ing the GDR’s legacy. The Party of 
Democratic Socialism (PDS), previ-
ously in power as the Socialist Uni-
ty Party, fought to maintain com-
munist-era names in city districts 
it controlled.45 The democratically 
elected PDS exhibited considerable 
support from the people. As the West 
German Parliament agreed to move 
the unified capital to Berlin in 1991, 
the city government formed a com-
mission to evaluate street names, 
instructed to change any who “op-
posed one totalitarian dictatorship, 
that of the National Socialists, in or-
der to replace it with another totali-
tarian dictatorship, that of the Com-
munists.”46 This narrow guideline 
displayed the government intention 
to create a politically “correct” and 
representative capital for unified 
Germany.47 The Bundestag imposed 
what constituted politically correct, 
opposing a historical interpretation 
favoring communism. 
 The qualifications considered po-
litically appropriate for street names 
were polarizing, highlighting the 
complexities of the previous era’s 
understanding. Conservatives gen-
erally regarded communists and fas-
cists in the same light, unworthy of 
commemoration with street names, 
while leftists favored anti-fascists, 
regardless of their political back-
ground48 The ideological links be-
tween anti-fascism and communism 
resulted in overlapping traits, ruling 
out many candidates from the Left. 
 The public’s response to East Ger-
man monuments illustrated another 
example of contested memory. Calls 
for the removal of all GDR monu-
ments were reminiscent of postwar 
denazification.49 The Allies agreed 
that Nazi symbols needed remov-
al to “make a break with the past,” 
resulting in Germany’s “unwisely 
buried and denied” history.50 The 
overall trend left an “unspoken ab-
sence which somehow reinforces 
the memory of the Hitler period.”51 
Berliners applied the memories and 
lessons from the Nazi period to 
decide on the fate of GDR monu-
ments. This way of moving on from 
the Nazi period in such a way stuck 
in the memory of Berliners. 
 The Post-GDR Era differed from 
the post-Nazi period because East 
Germans were ambivalent about 
the communist past.52 These mixed 
feelings were a stark contrast to the 
general agreement of the German 
population against Nazism, ren-
dering policy about monuments 
difficult to agree upon. Additional-
ly, no country imposed beliefs onto 
the populace. The freedom granted 
to each citizen further complicat-
ed popular agreement on policy. 
Students formed the Initiative on 
Public Monuments of the GDR to 
encourage informed public discus-
sion about individual sites.53 The 
mature approach demonstrated an 
improved understanding of the im-
plications associated with removing 
monuments. 
 Unlike the controversies sur-
rounding communist monuments 
and street names, no one seriously 
considered taking down the Berlin 
Soviet war memorials. The East and 
West German governments agreed 
to protect the memorials in return 
for the removal of Red Army troops 
from Germany in the September 
1990 “Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany.”54 
The nature of the alliance between 
the Soviets and East Germans, in-
cluding Soviet influence in the GDR 
state and ideology, made Soviet me-
morials more symbolic than street 
names and East German monu-
ments. There is ample evidence that 
these monuments would have been 
targets of anti-communist acts. 
Signing strong protective measures 
in advance indicates the Soviet un-
derstanding of the regional politi-
cal environment. The remembrance 
of other memorials’ degradation 
throughout Eastern Europe as So-
viet soldiers pulled back was fresh 
in Soviet minds.55 Wanting to avoid 
further humiliation and disrespect, 
the Soviets used foresight and lever-
age to guarantee this would not oc-
cur in Berlin. 
 Contentious deliberation was not 
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unique to Germany. Former com-
munist states across Eastern Europe 
struggle with the historical experi-
ence of the Soviet Union. Romanian 
politicians issued the Proclamation 
of Timişoara in 1990, proposing 
that former high-ranking commu-
nists be banned from public office 
for ten years.56 Subject to years of de-
bate, the proposal represented pop-
ular disagreement about the former 
regime. Russia experienced wide-
spread condemnation of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s. Veterans 
and monuments became frequent 
targets for their representation of 
the failed Soviet system.57Attacks 
on the Soviet liberation narrative 
were rampant and drew compar-
isons to fascism, contradictory to 
fundamental communist beliefs.58 
National humiliation encompassed 
Russia until the mid-1990s econom-
ic depression set in. At the 1993 Vic-
tory Day Demonstration, many of 
the common people joined the cele-
bration in defense of Red Army vet-
erans, relating their own struggle in 
the economic downturn to the vig-
orous criticisms against the veter-
ans’ efforts.59 Equating the veterans 
to their achievements, this aligning 
gesture defended Soviet accom-
plishments and victory. The idea of 
the Great Patriotic War emphasizing 
martyrdom, suffering, and trauma, 
linked these two previously sparring 
groups. 
 Putin’s rise to power in the early 
2000s ushered in an era of Russian 
reassertion of Great Power status. 
He has capitalized on the idea of 
the Great Patriotic War to height-
en nationalism and unify the Rus-
sian people to support geopolitical 
objectives, such as aggression in 
Ukraine and Georgia. The politics 
of remembrance are especially prev-
alent in Russia’s resurgence as a re-
gional power. A side effect has been 
the revitalization of historical inter-
pretations consistent with the origi-
nal intentions of Soviet monument 
planners. 
 The Communist Party’s reception 
of World War II victory illuminates 
why the Soviets invested so heavily 
in public works. The war legitimized 
the Soviet system, so building “pub-
lic displays of loyalty” was a way to 
continually remind people of Soviet 
control.60 In erecting monuments, 
leaders could impose carefully se-
lected messages onto audiences. 
Aleksandr Nekrich presents an in-
teresting example of censorship, as 
he fought at the Battle of Stalingrad 
and later challenged the notion of 
the “suddenness” of the 1941 Ger-
man invasion in a book.61 The KGB 
redacted this section, revoked his 
Communist Party membership, and 
no longer allowed him to write.62 
This brutal restriction hindered the 
ability of the individual, and wit-
ness, to deviate from the official nar-
rative. Like the “Nekrich Affair,” the 
active promotion of liberation at the 
Treptower memorial reminds indi-
viduals of the state’s power. 
 The renewed sense of historical 
pride has established the central po-
litical role of remembrance in East-
ern and Central Europe. The Russian 
state under Putin has reinvigorated 
the memory and mission of the So-
viet Union, synonymizing the past 
system with the present state. Soviet 
monuments have taken on renewed 
meaning in the modern Russian 
state. As the memorials continue 
to have an active life, their conten-
tion has complicated contemporary 
regional relations. Recent laws per-
mitting the removal of Soviet mon-
uments, accompanied with rampant 
vandalism, have soured relations 
between Russia and former Soviet 
bloc states. In 2006 someone stole 
60 bronze pieces from the memo-
rial in Pankow, Berlin to which the 
Russian embassy protested.63 Op-
posing interpretations of history are 
visible. The Russians, defending the 
commemoration of liberation and 
freedom, and many in Eastern Eu-
rope who perceive them as tributes 
to Soviet dominance. The fusion of 
Russian and Soviet identity means 
that threats of removal are taken as 
insulting to Russia. The resurgence 
of Russia as a significant European 
power has politicized the issue and 
strengthened justifications for their 
standing. 
 No instance better illustrates Rus-
sia’s assumption of the Soviet legacy 
than the 2007 relocation of a Red 
Army “liberator” statue in Tallinn. 
The move was celebrated by some, 
citing it as a symbol of Soviet dom-
inance and repression.64 It was met 




Russian government, proponents 
of the liberation view, and Estonia’s 
nearly one-fourth ethnic Russian 
population.65 The Russian outcry 
was considerable for a city in which 
it has a miniscule stake compared 
to Berlin. The symbolic value of 
Berlin as the capital of the Soviet 
rival ideology which it captured af-
ter a traumatizing war is extreme. 
Accounting for Russian protests to 
smaller instances of vandalism, like 
Pankow in 2006, one can assume a 
Tallinn-scale act would prompt a 
grave Russian response.  
 Preserving Soviet memorials is a 
way to perpetuate the memory of 
Soviet success. It creates a self-re-
inforcing cycle, justifying the con-
temporary rationalization serves 
to improve future prospects of its 
existence. Proponents of Soviet me-
morials concentrate on the act of the 
victory, resembling the 1945 Soviet 
liberator interpretation. Others view 
them as expressions of Soviet dom-
ination, instead focusing on the in-
ability to interpret history individu-
ally during the Soviet period. These 
polarized understandings represent 
the collective past struggles of indi-
viduals. 
Conclusion
 The Soviet monuments located 
in Berlin exemplify the impact of 
shifting contexts on the meaning of 
public space. Initially imposing So-
viet dominance and ideology, they 
still stand today, albeit with vary-
ing meanings according to different 
people. The Berlin memorials epit-
omize the Soviet paradox by sug-
gesting that the Soviet spirit is alive. 
With contemporary Russia assum-
ing the Soviet Union’s legacy, Rus-
sians retain the Soviet sentiments 
of ideology, war memory, and sym-
bolism found in the details of the 
Tiergarten, Pankow, and Treptower 
memorials. Additionally, Soviet me-
morials have acquired new meaning 
as representative of the Soviet past 
and Russian present and future, 
adding an active political role.  
 Russia’s geopolitical reorientation 
means that Soviet memorials will be 
at the forefront of future controver-
sy. Though people will remember 
Soviet repression, Russia will over-
take the memorials’ symbolism. No 
end is in sight for the memorials in 
Berlin. Diplomacy between Russian 
and German delegations will be 
necessary, as the agreement states 
no expiration. It will require a con-
certed effort, as they are much too 
large and complex to simply move 
or take down. Whether Soviet plan-
ners purposely included seeming-
ly endless life as an expression of 
domination is doubtful. However, 
the contemporary political environ-
ment created largely from the Soviet 
past seems to suggest eternal life for 
the Berlin memorials. 
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This was taken on Mt. Trebević during Emma Holmes’ gap year living in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. She 
had taken the cable car up the mountain with her cohort on October 27, 2019 to see the bobsled track used in the 
1984 Winter Olympics.
Photo by Emma Holmes, Class of 2024, Global Studies and Asian Studies
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Crescent among the 25 stars: 
Islam and Islamophobia within 
the European Union
By Labeeb Ahmed
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ca-Europe relations. After studying abroad in Vienna, Austria, and witnessing the Turkish and 
Slavic Muslim communities spread across Europe, he decided to write a piece that analyzes the 
current tense relationship between Islam and Christian Europe.
search Center. The paper will end 
with an explanation of how EU in-
tegration is affected by touching on 
divisions between the EU member 
states, the departure of one in part 
due to Islamophobia, and the refus-
al of others in part because of their 
Muslim culture.
Despite the surge of an Islamic 
presence in Europe after 2015, Islam 
is nothing new in Europe and not ev-
ery Muslim is a recent arrival, con-
trary to what many in Europe might 
believe. Drawing from centuries ago, 
one will learn of the Muslims who 
conquered vast swaths of the North 
Mediterranean and the Iberian 
Peninsula for over seven centuries. 
Meanwhile, in 1362, the Ottomans 
began their conquest of the Balkans 
and eventually captured Constanti-
nople, the capital of the Byzantine 
Empire. However, the most relevant 
illustration of the intertwined histo-
ry of Europe and Islam occurs after 
World War II (WWII). With Europe 
devastated post conflict, infrastruc-
ture was in dire need of repair. Yet 
with so many young men dead from 
the fight, noticeable labor shortages 
began. To fill this labor gap, Euro-
pean powers turned to their colo-
nies. Thus, hundreds of thousands 
of Indians, Pakistanis, and Bengalis 
went to the United Kingdom, Indo-
nesians and Surinamese went to the 
Netherlands, and North Africans 
went to France. Germany needed 
workers too and turned to its former 
ally in World War I (WWI), Turkey 
(the then-Ottoman Empire). Ger-
many accepted Turkish guest work-
ers, who were expected to leave; 
however, most simply decided to 
stay, transforming German society 
as a result.1 Knowing this informa-
tion, we can conclude the following; 
Muslims in Europe are nothing new, 
so for Europeans to be wary of Mus-
lims as a new presence is history un-
Inside the European Union, the rise in the number of Muslims and increased fear 
of Islam has increased tension and 
is stalling the integration of Europe, 
especially after the 2015 migrant 
crisis. Outside of the European 
Union (EU), Muslim-majority na-
tions such as Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Turkey attempt to 
be involved as members in a Union 
often cited as a “Christian Club” by 
critics for its lack of Muslim partic-
ipation. This paper is an attempt to 
showcase Islam’s rise in the EU and 
explain how EU integration suffers 
due to Islamophobia, especially af-
ter the 2015 crisis. To do this, I will 
examine the history of Islam in Eu-
rope, then examine the 2015 crisis, 
and interpret poll data and opinions 
on Muslims by Europeans today – 
largely drawn from modern new 
sources and non-partisan polling 
organizations such as the Pew Re-
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substantiated. 
Before examining the effects of 
modern Islamophobia in Europe, 
its history must be explained. Islam-
ophobia refers to the irrational hos-
tility, fear, and hatred of Muslims, 
Islam, and Islamic culture, and the 
active discrimination against these 
groups.2 Islamophobia manifests it-
self in Europe in several attitudes, 
behaviors, and actions. Classic ex-
amples of Islamophobia in Europe 
include attacks on property and 
places of worship, threats, religious 
profiling, and abuse. Also includ-
ed is discrimination in education, 
employment, housing, or access to 
goods and services. Legislation that 
disproportionally affects Muslims 
exists as well, such as with bans on-
wearing visible religious symbols or 
building mosques with minarets.3 
Islamophobia has caused many Eu-
ropeans to fear Muslims, hate Mus-
lims, stigmatize Muslims, treat them 
as the “Other,” and believe that Mus-
lims cannot be integrated into the 
fabric of the European Union. 
Despite the long history of Islam 
in Europe, the crisis in 2015 brought 
the presence of Islam back into ques-
tion in the EU. More than one mil-
lion migrants and refugees entered 
Europe in 2015. With countries 
struggling to cope with the massive 
influx and different views on how 
the influx should be handled, divi-
sions brewed in the EU. Syria had 
the highest number of people apply-
ing for asylum in the EU, followed 
by Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Alba-
nia, and Pakistan —  all Muslim-ma-
jority countries. Germany accepted 
the most asylum applications of any 
European state, followed by Sweden, 
Italy, France, and the Netherlands.4 
This event is the foundation upon 
which the modern discourse of Is-
lam and Islamophobia in Europe 
rests. 
The Islamophobia that existed be-
fore the 2015 Refugee Crisis surged 
in intensity and spread throughout 
the population after the crisis. Since 
that influx of migrants, unfavorable 
opinions increased in most Euro-
pean countries, according to a Na-
tional Observer 2016 survey of ten 
EU countries. Islamophobia surged 
by nine percent in the United King-
dom, by eight percent in Spain 
and Italy, and by twelve percent in 
Greece.5
Analyzing the effects of the crisis 
and the sudden influx of Muslims in 
different countries will show us the 
change in sentiments over Islam. 
Similar reactions occur in states 
with a large Muslim population 
and states with a low Muslim pop-
ulation. Given France’s history as a 
colonial power that once controlled 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia – 
three Muslim-majority countries 
– it becomes clear why there is a 
long history of francophone Mus-
lims from these countries traveling 
to France for work and new oppor-
tunities. Thus, France has the larg-
est Muslim population in the EU, 
with 8.8 percent of its population 
being Muslim.6 Despite the large 
and historic presence of Islam in 
France, France still has not become 
comfortable with it. In 2016, France 
drew controversy when French po-
lice confronted a woman wearing a 
burkini on a beach in Nice. The po-
licemen demanded that she remove 
the burkini and issued her a ticket, 
citing that she was not wearing an 
outfit “respecting good morals and 
secularism.”7 A year later, in 2017, 
French presidential elections were 
occurring and discussions on Is-
lamophobia were present in nearly 
every campaign. That same year, 10 
far-right militants were arrested by 
French anti-terrorist police because 
they planned attacks on Muslim 
places of worship.8
For countries that are less-de-
veloped and took in much less in 
terms of Muslim refugees, Islam-
ophobia has still increased. Hunga-
ry is a country that demonstrates 
the effects that the crisis had on Is-
lamophobia. Despite having one of 
the lowest shares of a foreign-born 
population anywhere in the devel-
oped world, Hungary’s current rul-
ing party, Fidesz, managed to win 
by targeting their campaign against 
immigration. This is rather ironic; 
given Hungary’s low fertility rate, 
immigration would massively help 
Hungary’s declining labor force. 
Hungary is not necessarily anti-im-
migrant; until March 2017, it ran a 
residency bond program targeted 
mostly at upper-class Asians. For a 
€300,000 investment in Hungarian 
government bonds, permanent resi-
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dency could be obtained, and 20,000 
people took this offer. This money 
was then usurped by corrupt mem-
bers of the government as well as 
used to fund the government propa-
ganda against Muslims in Europe.9 
Regarding immigrants, Orb.n’s gov-
ernment is specifically against Mus-
lims in particular; a government 
spokesman said that the Hungarian 
government “knows that
[Islam] is not going to integrate.”10 
Orb.n has been quoted saying that 
with mass migration,
“[Europe’s] worst nightmares 
have come true.”11He has called for 
an anti-migrant alliance to ban the 
continued arrival of new migrants at 
the European Union’s border. In part 
thanks to government propaganda, 
seventy-two percent of Hungarians 
have a negative view of Muslims in 
their country, whereas the EU aver-
age is only forty-three percent. 12
Poland is also guilty of Islam-
ophobia. In a survey done by the 
Pew Research Center, Poles have the 
most favorable view of the Europe-
an Union out of any member state.
eighty-four percent of Poles have 
a favorable view of the European 
Union, compared to a mere four-
teen percent who have anunfavor-
able view.13 Yet a paradox appears; 
the results from a survey conduct-
ed by the Polish Center for Pub-
lic Opinion Research (or C.B.O.S) 
show that while Poles are the biggest 
believers in the European Union, 
a clear majority would rather lose 
EU funds than accept Muslim ref-
ugees as part of the EU’s relocation 
processes. thirty-one percent of re-
spondents on this poll said that they 
believe refugees intend to “Islamize 
Europe” and twenty-three percent 
perceive refugees as potential ter-
rorists. 14
Directly related to the presence 
of Islamophobia and the citizens’ 
views on Muslims is the public per-
ception of just how many Muslims 
there are within the country. The 
average Polish citizen believes that 
Muslims constitute nearly seven 
percent of Polish society. In reality, 
the actual number of Muslims in 
Poland is a staggering seventy times 
less than that percentage, at only 0.1 
percent of the population.15 A 2014 
poll from the Social Research Insti-
tute found that French respondents 
believed that the percentage of Mus-
lims in France at around thirty-one 
percent, whereas the real percentage 
did not exceed six percent at the 
time, and Germans believed that 
nineteen percent of the population 
was Muslim, instead of the actual 
four percent.16 A 2016 Ipsos Mori 
Survey measured the gap between 
public perception and reality of 
Muslim communities in forty coun-
tries. The survey’s results showed 
that the public estimates of the size 
of Muslim communities were more 
than four times the actual level in 
France and three times the actual 
level in the UK. 17
Now, there is a question of why 
Islamophobia is so persistent in Eu-
rope and why so many Europeans 
believe that the population of Mus-
lims is larger than it truly is in their 
country. A major reason for this is 
government portrayal and propa-
ganda. Throughout time, scapegoats 
existed as a powerful political tool 
for corrupt leaders and govern-
ments to divert the public eye from 
their own problematic practices and 
inadequacies. One of the most pop-
ular scapegoats that governments 
today use are minority groups such 
as Muslims. Muslims are major tar-
gets, especially now, because the 
refugees that arrived in 2015 came 
from war-torn countries that did not 
allow for the same level of education 
that a Frenchman or Englishman 
would have received. The media, 
too, propels government propagan-
da to influence how citizens should 
think. Titled “The Islamic Rape of 
Europe,” Polish magazine wSieci, a 
mass-market politically conserva-
tive magazine, helped to instill fear 
into the population through this 
depiction of a “proper” Polish lady 
being harmed by darker-skinned 
men.18
Another reason for Islamopho-
bia’s persistence in Europe is terror-
ist attacks conducted by extremist 
Muslims. The September 11th at-
tacks in New York City arguably 
changed the West’s perspective on 
Muslims forever, and more recent 
events such as the terrorist acts 
committed by jihadists in London, 
Paris, Brussels, and Barcelona have 
caused even more fear and anxiety. 
Since 2001, it has been more com-
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mon for media outlets in Europe to 
report based on stereotypes and use 
the actions of radicals to portray an 
entire community of Muslims.19 
Islamophobia encourages Euro-
peans to believe that Muslims can-
not integrate properly and assimi-
late into European society, but that 
conclusion has been proven false. 
Europeans may think that Islam 
inherently goes against Western 
values, such as same-sex marriage. 
However, in a survey conducted by 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung, rough-
ly sixty percent of Muslim respon-
dents said that they support same-
sex marriage. This is not limited to 
“casual” Muslims either; forty per-
cent of Muslim respondents who 
consider themselves highly religious 
believe in same-sex marriage as 
well. Most of these Muslim respon-
dents have their origins in Turkey, 
the Muslim-majority country with 
the most emigration to Germany. In 
contrast to these Turkish-German 
Muslims, only twelve percent of 
highly-religious Muslims in Turkey 
say that there are in favor of same-
sex marriage. This disparity be-
tween Turkish-German and Turkish 
Muslim respondents illustratesthe 
absorption of German values in the 
German Muslim communities. Es-
sentially, Muslims in Germany feel 
at home there and are proven to 
have integrated into German soci-
ety. Despite this evidence, sixty-one 
percent of Germans feel that Islam 
is not compatible with life in the 
Western world, but the vast majority 
of Germans – nearly eighty-five per-
cent – say that they are tolerant of 
other religions. This is not the case 
with Islam.20 According to the Pew 
Research Center, half of the partici-
pating population believe that most 
Muslims want to be distinct from the 
larger society, with fifty-four per-
cent in the UK, forty-five percent in 
Poland, sixty-eight percent in Spain, 
and a staggering seventy-six percent 
in Hungary holding this belief. 21
Muslims integrated well into Eu-
rope not solely in terms of values, 
but also in terms of adoption of the 
national language(s), education, 
and success in the labor market. A 
2017 survey found that second and 
third-generation Muslims were bet-
ter educated, had a better command 
of the national language, and found 
more success in the labor market 
than first-generation Muslims who 
likely grew up outside of Europe. In 
Germany and Switzerland, the rate 
of gainful employment among Mus-
lims is not significantly different 
from that of the entire population. 
seventy-five percent of Muslim re-
spondents regularly spend their free 
time with non-Muslims, and, over-
all, nearly all respondents – nine-
ty-four percent – feel connected to 
the country that they live in. This 
underlines a crucial fact claimed 
by Bertelsmann Stiftung expert Ste-
phen Vogel; Islam is not an obstacle 
to successful integration into Euro-
pean society.22 Despite the integra-
tion, Muslims who actively practice 
their faith often encounter discrimi-
nation in the job
market.23
The rise of Islamophobia, espe-
cially after 2015, has contributed 
significantly to deintegrating the 
countries of the European Union. 
In 2017, the EU decided to sue the 
three members - Hungary, Poland, 
and the Czech Republic - for not 
respecting their quotas for refugee 
resettlement demanded by the EU. 
Hungary’s Orbán defended his de-
fiance against the EU by telling the 
German daily newspaper Bild that 
the Hungarian government does 
not see these migrants as Muslim 
refugees, but rather as “Muslim in-
vaders.” 24
Primary evidence of Islamopho-
bia de-integrating Europe, however, 
can be found in the United King-
dom. Among the countless reasons 
that Brexiteers cite is the rise of Is-
lamophobia contributed to British 
citizens voting to leave the European 
Union. According to anti-Muslim 
attack monitor TellMama, research-
ers at the monitor went from re-
ceiving roughly forty to fifty reports 
of Islamophobic incidences a day 
to thirty in merely three days after 
the passing of the EU. referendum. 
Most of these incidents were direct-
ly related to Brexit.25 The founder of 
TellMama, Fiyaz Mughal, believes 
that the cluster of hate crimes since 
the vote has been because of cer-
tain British citizens with “deeply 
prejudicial and bigoted views” be-
ing empowered and believing “that 
they can air them and target them at 
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predominantly Muslim women and 
visibly different settled communi-
ties.”26 Since the Brexit vote, such in-
cidents of Muslims in Europe being 
affected by Brexit are substantiated 
by reported attacks. For example, 
Muslims are being shouted at and 
told to leave because of British cit-
izens “voting ‘them’ out” with Brex-
it.27 Indeed, politicians who pushed 
for Brexit constantly used Islamic 
terror as a means to persuade voters 
that leaving the EU was absolutely 
necessary. Nigel Farage, a key politi-
cian in promoting Brexit, constantly 
pushed for leaving the EU to end the 
“terror threat,” and Boris Johnson 
has also seized the opportunity to 
comment that he believes Brexit will 
improve security in the UK.28 This 
rhetoric worked. The UK illustrates 
a prime example of how Islamopho-
bia can tear apart the integration of 
the European Union.
The European Union’s overall 
approach to migration has created 
an obstacle to solidarity within the 
union. As it stands, the union does 
not have in place a system through 
which member states can share the 
responsibility of hosting migrants 
fairly. Member states continue to 
clash with one another over the 
question of who should host the 
asylum seekers and other migrants 
who manage to reach the shores of 
Europe. While member states in the 
southern border of Europe close to 
the Mediterranean Sea want to over-
haul the current system to spread 
the responsibility and relocation 
quotas for migrant arrivals, coun-
tries such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are 
refusing to support this sort of fair 
mechanism.29 
A preconceived idea of what Is-
lam is and the reluctance of Euro-
pean member states to accept it is 
also reflected in the potential future 
integration of Europe, namely in the 
Muslim majority European states of 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Turkey. At the European Union 
level, there is nothing that forbids 
the entry of a Muslim-majority 
country into the predominantly 
Christian EU because there is no 
reference to religion in the constitu-
tion. Thus, the question of whether 
or not Turkey, for example, should 
be admitted into the EU should be 
asked at the national level. The the 
response is mostly negative; only 
thirty percent of Europeans are in 
favor of enlargement to include Tur-
key.30 This is not simply because of 
dissatisfaction with Erdogan’s cur-
rent rule. The administrations from 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first 
Turkish President, onwards trans-
formed Turkey into a fiercely sec-
ular state that oriented towards the 
West. In the span of seventy-five-
years, it joined all the regional West-
ern alliances such as NATO and the 
Council of Europe and played a vital 
role in the Western world during 
the Cold War. Yet being denied en-
try from the European Community, 
the EU’s predecessor, during a time 
when Turkey embraced Western 
values more dearly, signals an uneas-
iness with the Muslim culture of the 
country; this is why Turkish critics 
cite the EU as a “Christian Club”.31 
Whether or not the EU truly wishes 
to remain exclusive is debatable, it 
is clear that Islamophobia has been 
used in the past and will certainly 
continue to be a tool to reject the 
European countries more “foreign” 
to the current EU members
Despite its long presence on the 
continent, Islam continues to strike 
fear and repulsion into European 
society and legislation, especially 
post-2015. Member states of the EU 
still have large swaths of their popu-
lations with the following: unfavor-
able views of Muslims; not wanting 
more Muslims to immigrate; be-
lieving that there are more Muslims 
than there truly are in Europe; and 
believing that it is Muslims who 
choose to remain distinct rather 
than them being marginalized by 
the majority. All this has manifest-
ed into splintering in the union over 
opposing views on migration policy, 
with certain member states being 
sued and others leaving. Now, the 
problem of Islamophobia is inter-
twined with the EU’s future, and 
as the question of membership for 
three Muslim-majority European 
nations, the EU’s relationship with 
Islam will once again require more 
thought and analysis.
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International Human Rights Trailblazer: 
The Case of American Foreign Policy in 
Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’ Under the Carter 
Administration
By Brittany Broome
Brittany Broome is a December 2020 graduate of UNC-Chapel Hill who double majored in 
Public Policy and Global Studies with a minor in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). 
This course of study has allowed her to investigate US foreign policy and its intersection with 
social movements on the world stage. Through this, Brittany Broome became interested in in-
vestigating the role that human rights considerations play in international agenda-setting. Her 
Internationalist piece is the culmination of her research into the Carter administration’s human 
rights-focused foreign policy strategy which is understood to be the first time an American Pres-
ident made human rights a top priority in conducting foreign affairs.
rights atrocities.
     This paper will discuss the dynam-
ics of Argentina’s so-called Guerra 
Sucia or “Dirty War.” It will then 
move to explain how Washington, 
D.C.  handled the junta’s rise to pow-
er before the Carter administration, 
primarily focusing on Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger’s actions, as 
well as how the government’s po-
sition evolved once Jimmy Carter 
took office. The paper will analyze 
the policy decisions Carter made as 
president and his administration’s 
actions. Under Carter, the US gov-
ernment’s strong stance against the 
Argentine government’s abuse of its 
citizens led to the improvement of 
conditions in the country and the 
recognition of soft power diploma-
cy’s necessity.1
     President Jimmy Carter was the 
first contemporary American pres-
ident to place human rights at the 
forefront of his foreign policy agen-
da, both rhetorically and in action.2 
Understandably, his policies, on a 
grand scale, were not always regard-
ed as successful in achieving human 
rights-related ends in every corner 
of the globe.3 Nonetheless, his ad-
ministration served as a trailblazer 
for the government-mandated in-
clusion of human rights in foreign 
policy.4 Though Carter-style rela-
tions with abusive regimes did not 
continue into the Reagan adminis-
tration, the sentiment and intention 
of his team’s human rights-focused 
policies were undeniably formative. 
Today, the United States’ he-gemonic position in inter-national affairs is undeni-
able. In this role, the United States 
government has claimed to be a 
champion of human rights in the 
world, though, the integrity of this 
assertion is subject to much debate. 
President Jimmy Carter played an 
instrumental role in shaping how 
the government considers interna-
tional human rights in its formula-
tion of a foreign policy agenda. A 
key example of this phenomenon is 
the Carter administration’s handling 
of relations with Latin America, 
specifically Argentina, during the 
late 1970s and into the early 1980s— 
a time when the governing military 
junta was committing gross human 
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Current and future American gov-
ernments can still find these policies 
useful in considering how the Unit-
ed States government should move 
forward in international affairs to-
day. As highlighted through his ef-
forts in Argentina, President Jimmy 
Carter placed soft power, centered 
around human rights protections, at 
the heart of American international 
policy— an action that changed the 
fabric and character of the United 
States’ diplomatic practice as it was 
known.5 This paper argues that, 
while the Carter administration 
cannot be cited as the direct source 
for the fall of the junta in 1983, its 
aggressive policies against Argen-
tina’s human rights abuses inserted 
the issue of human rights saliently 




     Argentina’s “Dirty War” marks 
a time in the country’s history that 
is colored by gross human rights 
abuses by the military junta gov-
ernment. Officially, the war began 
with a coup d’état in 1976 and end-
ed when the junta fell from power 
in 1983. Moreover, Argentines were 
already familiar with social unrest 
and terrorist violence in the years 
leading up to the coup that removed 
President Isabel Perón from office.6 
Before the coup, Argentina experi-
enced years of politically-motivated 
left-wing guerrilla violence, includ-
ing bombings, kidnappings, theft, 
and murders. Right-wing Argen-
tine Army Commander-in-Chief 
Jorge Rafael Videla took control of 
the country after the military coup. 
His new government vowed to crack 
down on the radical left. Videla and 
the military considered leftist ter-
ror threats and attacks from groups 
like the Montoneros as acts of war. 
The junta proceeded to combat per-
ceived subversives using techniques 
similar to the terrorists themselves 
(i.e. murder and kidnapping).7 The 
tactics in which the junta engaged 
were compounded by the agree-
ment known as “Operation Con-
dor,” in which the security services 
of Southern Cone states (Chile, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uru-
guay, and Brazil) joined together 
to counter terrorism and political 
subversion through “coordinated 
psychological warfare operations 
directed against leftist and radical 
groups”.8 Because of this interna-
tional cooperation against leftist 
groups in the fight against commu-
nism, the indiscriminate tactics 
against those labeled as left-wing 
terrorists throughout the region 
made the human rights situation 
of many Latin American countries 
dire. By the end of the ‘Dirty War’, it 
is estimated that roughly 30,000 Ar-
gentines were killed, nearly 500 chil-
dren were taken from their parents 
or born to detained mothers and 
then given to families sympathetic 
to the military with new identities, 
and more than 9,000 are classified 
as desaparecidos, “disappeared per-
sons.” The disappeared are those 
who were kidnapped by the govern-
ment and they were never to be seen 
again, many are thought to be vic-
tims of “death flights” that dumped 
hundreds of drugged prisoners into 
the Atlantic Ocean.9 As for the chil-
dren, Argentine citizens are still try-
ing to uncover their identities and 
reunite them with their families.
     Since the 1800s and the passage of 
the Monroe Doctrine and its subse-
quent Roosevelt Corollary, the secu-
rity and stability of Latin American 
nations have been of great impor-
tance to the United States’ region-
al interests. This was heightened 
during the 1970s and 1980s, when 
Latin America was viewed as a hot-
bed for human rights violations.10 
The violent actions of the Argentine 
junta during this time only further 
exasperated these issues. President 
Carter’s interest in improving hu-
man rights globally made Argentina 
a clear target for his efforts. Never-
theless, the attitudes of the United 
States government were not always 
consistent with how to address the 
Argentine problem between admin-
istrations.
Kissinger and the Years Before 
Carter
     President Gerald Ford, along with 
his active and influential Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, was a strong 
proponent of implementing realist 
American foreign policies. During 
the Ford administration, human 
rights took “secondary priority” and 
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Kissinger was known to respond 
obstinately to any initiatives aimed 
at improving human rights around 
the world. He has said that human 
rights “are not appropriate” as a 
foundational basis of American 
foreign policy.18 Kissinger’s bal-
ance-of-power approach in his Re-
alpolitik was the norm of the bipolar 
Cold War era. It was instead Carter 
and his administration that took 
advantage of the increasingly mul-
tipolar world order in the 1970s to 
advance the United States’ position 
in fighting to promote human rights 
around the globe.19
President Carter’s Foreign 
Policy Platform
     On the first day of his presiden-
cy, January 20, 1977, Jimmy Carter 
asserted that human rights should 
be upheld in American policy, not 
only domestically, but also world-
wide. In his inaugural address, 
Carter explained that the United 
States was the “first society open-
ly to define itself in terms of both 
spirituality and human liberty” and 
that because of this, it is part of the 
country’s responsibility to “take on 
those moral duties” and “help shape 
a just and peaceful world that is tru-
ly humane.”20 A few months later, in 
an address at Notre Dame Univer-
sity, President Carter famously re-
marked that America is “now free of 
that inordinate fear of Communism 
which once led us to embrace any 
dictator who joined us in our fear.”21 
This sentiment was the driving force 
ative of his department. Concern-
ing Argentina specifically, Secretary 
Kissinger was seen to be sympathet-
ic to the junta. In a June 1976 meet-
ing with Argentine Foreign Minis-
ter Guzzetti, Kissinger told him “If 
there are things that have to be done, 
you should do them quickly. But 
you must get back quickly to nor-
mal procedures.”15 Such statements 
made it clear that the United States 
would acquiesce in overlooking hu-
man rights abuses if they occurred 
in regimes that supported the fight 
against communism or served larg-
er-scale political purposes.
     During this time, it was Congress 
that took initiative in advocating 
for international human rights. Na-
tional public opinion was saliently 
becoming more favorable towards 
human rights promotion, inspired 
by American Civil Rights and an-
ti-Vietnam movements.16 One way 
in which Congress managed to 
make progress on a human rights 
agenda was through Section 502B of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
This section provided for cuts in se-
curity assistance to countries found 
to be engaging in human rights vio-
lations. Additionally, Congressman 
Donald Fraser from Minnesota uti-
lized the chairmanship of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs as an 
avenue to investigate and shed light 
on human rights violations and ad-
vancements throughout the world.17 
Regardless of this, Kissinger found 
ways to sidestep these Congressio-
nal efforts.
were seen as the product of strong 
policies focused on the national se-
curity objective of containing com-
munism.11 This understanding of 
human rights as a political byprod-
uct is exemplified through President 
Ford’s signing of the 1975 Helsinki 
Accords, which utilized détente pol-
icy in an attempt to quell the Cold 
War tensions between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.12 The 
Accords included human rights 
provisions, particularly in the Third 
Basket, which was appealing to Ford 
because of its focus on the freedom 
of movement for individuals and the 
free flow of information— policies 
of strategic importance to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA-
TO).13 Though the Helsinki Accords 
introduced human rights into the 
American foreign policy discussion, 
they were maintained as nothing 
more than a strategic point in the 
Cold War and the fight against com-
munism. Consequently, even after 
the Helsinki Accords were signed, 
Kissinger did not implement hu-
man rights promotions extensively 
in foreign policy.14
     Because the administration’s 
priority was the containment of 
communism, it did not shy from 
working with repressive right-wing 
governments while fighting left-
wing forces. Secretary Kissinger 
was known to only promote human 
rights “as a means to a different end” 
and made it clear that penalizing 
human rights abusers through aid 
reductions would not be a prerog-
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that led Carter to believe that the 
United States no longer needed to 
cooperate with dictators and leaders 
who operated contrary to American 
values. Carter made it clear that his 
campaign promise to elevate human 
rights to the frontlines of American 
policy were not just talking points. 
It became his objective to oversee a 
comprehensive agenda of interna-
tional issues that would place the 
United States as an international 
hegemon politically, economically, 
and morally.22
The Carter Administration’s 
Stance towards Argentina
Reduction in Military Aid and 
Assistance
     The Carter administration took 
a special interest in the Argentine 
issue and sought to combat it not 
solely through diplomatic means, 
but also through withholding mili-
tary assistance to the junta. In only 
his second month in office, Presi-
dent Carter made the move to cut 
U.S. military aid to Argentina near-
ly in half— reducing it from for-
ty-eight million dollars to just twen-
ty-five million dollars. This move 
by the new President was shocking 
and unsettling to a large number 
of high-ranking officials in the Ar-
gentine government.23 It was a stark 
break from the “quiet diplomacy” 
of the Kissinger era and relatively 
unencumbering policies the Ar-
gentines had become accustomed 
to with the previous administra-
tion. Carter had the goal of sending 
a message to Argentina and other 
regimes committing human rights 
atrocities that they could not benefit 
militarily from the United States as 
long as they continued their abuses. 
Nonetheless, because of the complex 
nature of the military arrangement 
already established between the Ar-
gentine and American governments, 
there were still cases where training, 
spare parts, and equipment, were 
given to Argentina in gestures of 
good faith that certain American of-
ficials wanted to maintain.24 Others 
in government, like Senator Edward 
“Ted” Kennedy, protested any con-
cessions of military aid and assis-
tance to the regime, even if in “good 
faith”.25 Their opposition was born 
in the belief that there could be no 
leniency until the Argentine gov-
ernment demonstrated “substantial 
progress.” According to a 1984 study 
of the relationship between foreign 
aid and human rights violations, 
the Carter administration policies 
of foreign assistance had no statisti-
cal pattern of influence over human 
rights violations in the world holis-
tically. However, for the Argentine 
case specifically, there was, in fact, a 
substantial decrease in military aid 
and assistance to Argentina during 
the Carter administration as op-
posed to his predecessor.26
Diplomatic and Economic 
Policies
     The intense diplomatic maneu-
vering of Carter administration 
officials and their Argentine coun-
terparts highlights a striking differ-
ence in the priorities of each coun-
try. Both leaders were convinced 
in the necessity of their actions so 
negotiations were not expected to 
be easy. Videla’s government truly 
seemed to believe that what it was 
doing— detaining people suspected 
of being subversives and then sub-
jecting them to torture, rape, and 
even murder—was necessary and 
just action for protecting Argentine 
national security interests.27 None-
theless, Videla’s government, like 
others in Latin America at the time, 
did not want to be diplomatically or 
economically isolated and discred-
ited by the global system. For this 
reason, President Carter utilized 
diplomatic engagements, such as 
the September 1977 Panama Canal 
Treaty, to raise his concerns to Vide-
la and others over the atrocities he 
saw occurring in their countries.28 
On such occasions, he even made 
specific requests for the release of 
prisoners in Argentina as well as the 
publication of comprehensive lists 
of detained and disappeared per-
sons in the country.29
     In conjunction with diplomatic 
attempts to reason with Videla, the 
Carter administration also refused 
to support twenty-eight loans to 
Argentina from International Fi-
nancial Institutions (IFIs).30 The 
administration believed its defi-
ance in not supporting IFI loans to 
Argentina and countries in similar 
situations served as a strong signal 
of its disapproval of totalitarian and 
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abusive policies.31 This sentiment, 
while successful in theory, was also 
only as effective as the entire in-
ternational community’s resolve 
to impose economic punishment 
on these countries. Unfortunately, 
many of these loans passed through 
and were given to Argentina despite 
abstention from the United States. It 
is not, however, that the diplomat-
ic and economic attempts to push 
Argentina to end its abusive tirade 
were failures; in turn, these actions 
indicated that the Carter admin-
istration moved on its own in this 
regard before human rights agendas 
took hold in the foreign policy plat-
forms of the international commu-
nity at-large.
Effects of the Administra-
tion’s Policies
      Not every attempt by the Carter 
administration to promote human 
rights in Argentina was a definitive 
success. Private industry, as well as 
alternative sources of military aid 
and economic support to Argentina 
by other countries, hampered the 
administration’s objective of pres-
suring the junta into submission.32 
Carter could not merely force Ar-
gentina’s hand and induce them to 
implement policies favored by the 
United States. Nevertheless, the 
economic and military pressures 
placed upon Argentina by the Car-
ter administration did make clear 
that the junta’s human rights abus-
es would no longer be tolerated by 
the United States.33 Through this, 
the administration made substan-
tial improvements in the American 
institutional system for internation-
al human rights promotion. Carter 
and his team in the State Depart-
ment attempted to provide teeth to 
the Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, previously 
handicapped under Kissinger, by 
bringing in civil rights experts and 
putting their objectives into the 
light for the American public.34
     Unfortunately, the Carter admin-
istration’s successes in some oth-
er parts of the world were bleaker 
than they proved to be in Argen-
tina–– the Iran Hostage Crisis is a 
primary example. These shortcom-
ings drew much criticism and in-
fluenced Carter’s successor, Ronald 
Reagan, to revert to similar policies 
of the Kissinger era. Relatively early 
in his time in office, President Rea-
gan denigrated human rights pol-
icies and relegated them to a lower 
priority than Carter had done. The 
new administration viewed Carter’s 
concerns for human rights at the 
expense of American national se-
curity interests as weak and began 
to show support for the Argentine 
government.35 Reagan thought that 
the country needed a more “realis-
tic” approach to human rights and 
foreign affairs, but by his second 
term moved back toward a more 
Carter-esque, positive stance on the 
importance of human rights.36
     Carter’s successors each took a 
different approach to resolve the 
complex nature of institutionaliz-
ing human rights policies in diverse 
countries around the globe. Ronald 
Reagan attempted a neoconserva-
tive approach similar to that of Ford 
before slightly softening his policies; 
George H. W. Bush tried to be more 
pragmatic in his handling of human 
rights and, in many ways, still did 
not succeed; Bill Clinton did not 
seem to have a specific foreign poli-
cy orientation in any sense; George 
W. Bush’s foreign policy was domi-
nated by the War on Terror, in which 
human rights took a back seat; and 
Barack Obama moved closer to 
Carter’s vision of globally connected 
societies that strived to promote hu-
man rights.37 Today, President Don-
ald Trump’s administration seems 
to be backing away from an inter-
national human rights-centered for-
eign policy agenda as it turns to a 
more nationalist focus. 
Conclusion
     Many historians and politicians 
alike assess President Jimmy Car-
ter’s emphasis on human rights as 
the preeminent focus in his foreign 
policy agenda to be idealist at best. 
He indeed placed the moral virtue 
of what he saw to be at the core of 
the American people at the center of 
his policymaking. However, it was 
Carter’s conception of the United 
States’ role in the world as one in 
which “idealism was a practical and 
realistic approach to foreign affairs” 
and a vehicle to exert American in-
fluence.38 When looked at holistical-
ly, his global affairs policies were not 
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always able to meet the high stan-
dards set out by his “absolute” com-
mitment to human rights promo-
tion. However, it is not accurate to 
say that President Jimmy Carter and 
those in his administration were 
unsuccessful in promoting human 
rights in the region. Their policies 
changed US.-Latin American rela-
tions in a way that demonstrated the 
US government would not always 
be bedfellows with abusive regimes. 
Furthermore, President Carter 
showed the world that his policies 
were making headway in combating 
the gross human rights violations 
in the hemisphere through the cre-
ation of the Interamerican Commis-
sion on Human Rights and Interam-
erican Court on Human Rights.39 
     No presidential administration 
after Carter has made any great-
er improvements in balancing the 
implementation problems faced by 
human rights-oriented policies with 
the vast array of American nation-
al security and political interests.40 
Nevertheless, in the words of former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Pub-
lic Affairs William Hodding Carter, 
“the most extraordinary departure 
from American foreign policy in 
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lack of coverage. Evidence suggests 
the market of female audiences is 
growing all the time.2 The solution 
to the disparities faced in coverage 
and microaggressions may rest with 
female journalists who are more 
likely to quote and report on women 
than men. 3 In a vicious cycle, gen-
der hiring practices in sports jour-
nalism are unequitable, perpetuat-
ing the media’s problematic limited 
attention to female sport. Media or-
ganizations must support women in 
editorial and leadership roles if they 
wish to avoid sexist culture and the 
estrangement of female fanatics.  
Coverage (or Lack Thereof)  
     Women’s sports across the board 
receive far less than equal media 
coverage around the world. In the 
United States, women make up 
about forty percent of athletes but 
approximately two to four percent 
of all coverage.4 Televised sporting 
displays a particular disparity for 
females where just 1.5 percent of all 
programming is dedicated to wom-
en’s athletics.5 The lack of coverage 
reinforces the societal belief that 
sports are the realm of men, because 
that is the only gender displayed 
time and again across the screen. 
Cheryl Cooky, an associate profes-
sor of women’s gender and sexuali-
ty studies at Purdue University, has 
been studying televised sports news 
for more than twenty years and 
claims she has witnessed a decline 
in the coverage of women during 
her research.6 Others have gathered 
evidence to suggest coverage has in-
creased to some capacity.  
     Increased coverage in recent 
years may appear to have occurred, 
however, the content and sports 
The Chicago newspaper’s infamous Twitter headline read “Wife of Bears’ line-
man wins a bronze medal today in 
Rio Olympics.”1 Corey Cogdell-Un-
rein had just won her second Olym-
pic medal in trap shooting only to 
have her name and success attribut-
ed to her spouse’s athletic career. 
Unfortunately, microaggressions 
such as this one are not uncommon 
in the media’s coverage of women’s 
sports. Moreover, the coverage it-
self is problematic, as it is nearly 
non-existent compared to the at-
tention men’s sports receive. Society 
has arbitrarily placed sport within 
the domain of men. The debate is 
often framed by the claim that in-
sufficient interest in female athletics 
makes them unprofitable. The real 
question is whether or not the rea-
son behind  the lack of interest is the 
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categories are more isolated 
than statistics suggest. In the 2016 
Rio Olympics, women’s sports sur-
passed men’s receiving 58.5 percent 
of the competition broadcast time 
on NBC’s telecasts.7 Digging deep-
er, mid-way through the Olympics 
the network was revealed to have 
registered over two hours dedicat-
ed to women’s beach volleyball and 
nearly three hours to women’s gym-
nastics.8 It would be remiss to ignore 
the fact that these two sports require 
particularly revealing uniforms. 
Additionally, it is common that 
Olympic coverage is dedicated to 
traditionally feminine sports such 
as figure skating and gymnastics 
indicating the tendency to support 
women in high-level sporting only 
if they fit into the “feminine mold.”9 
Furthermore, Olympic reporting 
of female athletes in the media of-
ten includes in-depth backstories 
with more about their familial rela-
tionships, spouses, and life outside 
of sports.10 While these stories are 
interesting, they are not an equal 
statistic to be compared with the 
time men’s pure on-court, athleti-
cally competent action receives. By 
covering select feminine sports and 
female athletes’ non-athletic life, the 
increased content is essentially just 
more of the same. Other defenders 
of increased—though still nowhere 
near equal—coverage point to web-
sites specifically devoted to women’s 
sports like ESPN-W. Platforms such 
as these are “a double-edged sword” 
as they do generate more content 
about women’s sports but simulta-
neously “compartmentalize it away 
from the mainstream of sports 
coverage.”11 Exacerbating the prob-
lematic unequal coverage of female 
sports are the microaggressions that 
often appear in the media when 
content is devoted to women.  
Microaggressions in “Girls’” 
Sports 
     Microaggressions in women’s 
sports media are a manifestation of 
socialized sexist biases in which our 
culture is entrenched.12 It should not 
be discounted that biological differ-
ences between male and female ath-
letes exist relevantly in the context 
of sport. However, gender norms 
have been constructed as attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviors about how 
men and women should conduct 
themselves. These conventions are 
social concepts with no biological 
backing that are further fortified 
in the microaggressions present-
ed by the media. Microaggressions 
are usually not intentional, rather 
automatic statements or actions oc-
curring often enough that they may 
even be overlooked or informed as 
harmless jokes.13 The repetition is 
part of the socialization cycle which 
must be addressed to stop prob-
lematic comments, headlines, and 
articles. A 2010 study created a tax-
onomy for the types of microaggres-
sions female athletes face most fre-
quently including the “assumption 
of inferiority, sexual objectification, 
and restrictive gender roles.”14
     Assuming women are inferi-
or revolves around the notion that 
they are less capable mentally or 
physically compared to men.15 The 
lack of media coverage indirectly 
is evidence of the conviction that 
men’s sports garner more interest 
due to their strength, speed, and 
excitement. Referring to females as 
“girls” or “ladies” while rarely term-
ing males “boys” or “gentlemen” in 
sports broadcasting also assumes a 
woman is meant to view the male 
in authority or behave within a cer-
tain polite confines while men are 
allowed to be more aggressive and 
rowdy. One study analyzed the en-
tire ESPN Sport Science series, a 
collection of videos that assesses 
performance in terms of biome-
chanics, to find differences between 
how women and men were por-
trayed. Researchers found female 
athletes were often compared to 
their male counterparts while the 
males were never compared to fe-
males. This approach was seen as 
a way to “legitimize female sports 
accomplishments as athletic.16 Here 
male athletes are the standard to 
which all athletes are compared, 
which further entrenches the notion 
of male athletic superiority.”17 One-
way physical comparisons are an-
other familiar example of inferiority 
microaggressions. 
     Female athletes are sexualized 
in the way the media portrays their 
personhood as reminiscent of the 
catch-phrase “sex sells.” Objectifica-
tion involves minimizing the value 
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or whole being of a woman to her 
body or body parts.18 Female ath-
letes are frequently posed in sexu-
al ways with revealing clothing, or 
none at all, in sporting magazines. 
These star athletes have the right to 
pose in whatever way and outfit they 
please if it makes them feel empow-
ered. Their motivation should be 
driven by internal desires though, 
not the societal or industry pressure 
to appear sexy and feminine de-
spite being an athlete. Serena Wil-
liams, Jennie Finch, Danica Patrick, 
and Lindsay Vonn were all granted 
Sports Illustrated  covers only after 
they posed for the (SI) swimsuit is-
sue of their respective years.19 This 
pattern of receiving rewarded rec-
ognition for the professional’s sport 
after their bodies were revealed, also 
reveals the objectifying expectations 
of mainstream media companies. 
Being a powerhouse athlete and be-
ing a woman do not have to be mu-
tually exclusive characteristics.  
     More broadly than sexual ob-
jectification, gender roles are over-
ly emphasized in sporting media 
restricting women to narrowly 
defined acceptable behaviors and 
images. For example, commenta-
tors have remarked about elite ath-
letes’ tennis grunts or arguments 
with the officials referring to them 
as “ritualized yelling.”20 The aggres-
sion and strength behind these ac-
tions are deemed too masculine for 
women who are expected to always 
embody the delicate and soft nature 
that has been arbitrarily attributed 
to females. In addition to the Sports 
Illustrated  swimsuit sexual objec-
tification editions, Brittney Griner, 
who is arguably one of the greatest 
female basketball players ever, re-
mains without a cover likely because 
she does not fit the feminine mold.21 
Griner has been unapologetical-
ly herself, embracing her sexuality, 
height, and strength since entering 
the WNBA but those characteris-
tics do not fit the framework society 
shaped and the media upholds.  
Globalized from Washing-
ton to Sydney  
     Similarly horrendous discrep-
ancies in coverage and instances 
of microaggressions are common 
throughout the world. In the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Australia, less than 
ten percent of televised reporting 
and newspaper stories are focused 
on women’s athletics.22 According 
to the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) on women and the 
media, the sporting situation could 
be argued as even worse-off in other 
non-English-speaking, smaller na-
tions across the globe.23 Throughout 
the report, it is constantly cited that 
women’s sports and female sporting 
journalists are underrepresented.24 
UNESCO has created a search-en-
gine extension called “Her Head-
line” which searches and highlights 
online media for gender stereotypes 
that many have become desensi-
tized to as the norm. As Schmidt 
concludes, “the hegemonic mascu-
linity of sports, and sports media, 
is not associated with any particular 
national identity or bounded by any 
geographic border,”25 meaning the 
issue of sexist sports exists globally.  
The Chicken or the Egg 
     The golden question around the 
discrepancy in the attention given to 
men and women’s competitive sport 
is whether it is the lack of interest 
leading to the lack of coverage or the 
lack of coverage leading to the lack 
of interest. Valid arguments from 
both market and normative frame-
works can be made, but this paper 
is focused primarily on the media’s 
role as gate-keepers. Greater expo-
sure could be the key to changing 
norms. Data collected across the 
UK, US, and Australia demonstrat-
ed that female journalists were sig-
nificantly less likely to perceive the 
current level of women’s sports cov-
erage appropriate and adequate than 
male journalists.26 Further, scholars 
have evidence that interest in fe-
male sports increases when women 
are presented with images of fierce 
and competent athletes.27 In other 
words, perhaps the truer story is 
that society requires a mindset shift 
that could result from an increased 
publicizing of impressive women in 
sport. After all, the 2015 Women’s 
World Cup final game is the most-
watched soccer match of any gender 
in United States history28 and that is 
due in part to the intensive cover-
age. A potential market of untapped 
interest lies beneath the surface.  
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Female Fandom  
     The number of female sports fans 
across large English-speaking coun-
tries is increasing each year.29 Specif-
ically in the United States, as of 2018, 
women comprised forty-six percent 
of the entire NFL fanbase.30 During 
the last summer Olympic games, 
women made up more than half 
of the NBC prime-time viewers.31 
This proof of interest does not auto-
matically mean that the same pop-
ulations would show-up to watch 
more women’s athletics, but it does 
provide a market opportunity for 
capitalizing organizations. If media 
companies continue to televise or 
publish microaggressions, maintain 
strict gender barriers, and refuse to 
increase the streaming of women’s 
competitions, they could be alienat-
ing a growing audience.32 Alongside 
expanded female interest in engag-
ing with athletic media, women’s de-
sire to directly participate in sports 
journalism has evolved as well.  
Women Want to Take the 
Lede 
     Women are increasingly interest-
ed in becoming professional sports 
journalists. Females make up near-
ly sixty-five percent of journalism 
and communications majors across 
America today.33 The reality these 
women face in sports broadcasting 
and writing, however, is bleak. In 
the UK, only three percent of sports 
journalists are women, yet in the 
United States, less than ten percent 
of newspaper sports articles from 
the last 30 years in total were writ-
ten by women.34 Hiring practices 
that have created a significant lack 
of diversity amongst professionals 
in the field are due for serious re-
evaluation.  
Failing Grades in Gender 
Hires 
     For the fifth consecutive year in 
2018, jobs including sports editors, 
columnists, reporters, and copy ed-
itors received an F for gender hires 
in the sports journalism industry.35 
Overall, hiring practices were not 
much better according to Central 
Florida’s Institute for Diversity and 
Ethics in Sports study, which gave 
more than seventy-five news out-
lets a D-plus final grade.36 In fact, 
ninety percent of all sports editors 
and 88.5 percent of television sports 
reporters are men in the US.37 The 
lack of women in powerful positions 
in sports journalism is striking and 
better explains why the disparity in 
coverage has persisted for decades. 
Furthermore, newsroom culture for 
women is notoriously difficult since 
athletics have been gendered as a 
male domain by society. Surveys 
demonstrate male journalists find 
women as less credible and assume 
they instinctively know more about 
sports than women.38 When women 
are given sports reporting assign-
ments, the types of stories awarded 
are statistically more often ‘human 
interest’ pieces.39 This procedure is 
likely linked to the belief that fe-
males are sensitive and interested in 
the emotional side of sports making 
them better candidates for a fluffier 
story. The failing hiring practices 
and difficult work culture are rein-
forcing factors in the discrimination 
in coverage and microaggressions 




     Women are more likely to quote 
other women, give other women 
more reporting attention, and cov-
er other women more respectful-
ly than men.40 According to recent 
survey data, 74.8 percent of women 
believed that female sporting should 
be given greater media coverage.41 
Women are rarely quoted in articles 
unless the story is about an all-fe-
male sport. In comparison, men are 
featured in articles about women’s 
sports as cited experts across news-
papers in the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Australia.42 If women 
are referenced in a male-dominat-
ed sport piece or even in women’s 
sports articles, it is most frequently 
for their familial or domestic role in 
the life of an athlete.43 The inequality 
in quoting demonstrates, yet again, 
the perception that the female’s role 
is in the home while the male’s is in 
the game.  
     Terry McDonnell was Managing 
Editor and then Editor-in-Chief for 
Sports Illustrated from 2002-2012 
where he was named one of Sport’s 
Business Journal’s  50 Most Influen-
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tial People.44 Before his time with 
SI , McDonnell worked as an editor 
for the US Weekly tabloid and Men’s 
Journal. His time in these posts 
“would noticeably influence SI ’s 
direction” as more male-driven.45 It 
was under McDonnell’s leadership 
that the aforementioned disturbing 
female magazine cover practices 
for Williams, Finch, Patrick, Vonn, 
and Griner took place. Yet, McDon-
nell is just one editor out of all the 
ninety percent of positions domi-
nated by men in sports journalism. 
If women are to be covered more 
often in more respectful ways, there 
must be positions for them in man-
agement and editorial boardrooms. 
The cycle is continued as women 
are stuck with human interest sto-
ries while promotions are reserved 
for high-profile reporting. Without 
the opportunity to excel in serious 
sporting stories, the promotions re-
main out of reach.46 The answer to 
women’s sports equity in the media 
may rely on hiring women and hir-
ing them to influential positions.  
Hear Women, Hire Women 
     A desire amongst women to see 
more females represented in sports 
journalism is exhibited, as six-
ty-eight percent have reported they 
feel women deserve a more prom-
inent role.47 Not only are women 
more likely to cover and quote wom-
en, but also their image or names on 
substantive athletic reporting could 
change the gender culture around 
sporting altogether as a powerful 
example to the rest of society. Sexu-
al objectification, restrictive gender 
roles, and assumptions of inferiori-
ty—which can appear without mali-
cious intent—may emerge simply as 
a result of inexperience in covering 
women’s sports.48 Perhaps placing 
women who have had this experi-
ence due to a tendency to quote and 
advocate for female athletics would 
mitigate the microaggression cul-
ture. Oftentimes, sports broadcast-
ers are retired athletes who have 
dealt first-hand with their own me-
dia portrayal that could give mean-
ingful recommendations from a 
reporter or managerial perspective. 
Additionally, hiring former athletes 
who defy the feminine standard of 
televised sports would not only of-
fer a more representative portrayal 
of the female sporting community 
but also would break through soci-
ety’s conception of gender confines. 
The problem and solution are best 
bound together when it is explained 
that if “the voices of female sports-
writers are muted, women’s sports 
and female athletes lose their best 
advocate.”49 The lack of female sports 
journalists mutually reinforces the 
disparities in coverage and sexist 
language around women’s athletics. 
Media organizations should fix the 
failing diversity and inclusion hir-
ing grades by placing more women 
in professional roles of authority to 
end the cycle of offensive commen-
tary and increase the coverage of 
women’s sports while also growing 
the emerging female market. 
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